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GREATER FISCAL DISCIPLINE? 
 
 
The effectiveness of foreign aid has been studied from various perspectives. The current aid 
system has come under a lot of criticism and the relevance of aid giving in eradicating extreme 
poverty has been widely questioned.  
 
Even though aid has been found to have a strong, positive impact on growth, there is a concern 
about other possible effects. Among them is the concern about its impact on aid receiving country 
government’s fiscal discipline. However the research done to date does not properly take into 
consideration that there exists a variety of aid instruments, which might have different impact. 
 
This thesis addresses the question, whether foreign aid has an impact on fiscal discipline of the 
aid receiving country’s government, and whether different aid instruments differ in this respect. It 
is first shown theoretically that the traditional forms of aid, which are managed outside the 
government budget, distort incentives to maintain fiscal discipline, whereas supporting directly 
government budgets strengthens the budget process and so results in greater fiscal discipline. 
 
The empirical part further tests the hypothesis. Fiscal discipline in terms of debt sustainability 
under the two aid systems is assessed for 11 Sub-Saharan African countries. Data has been 
collected from various publicly available sources. The debt sustainability computations indicate 
greater fiscal discipline in the sample countries since they receive budget support.  
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Introduction 
 
Motivation and background 
This thesis examines the fiscal impact of two broad categories of foreign aid: budget support and 
off-budget aid. During the past 30 years aid effectiveness has been studied from different 
ideological perspectives and by using various methodologies. There are several issues that 
complicate the evaluation of aid effectiveness. First of all it is by no means clear what is to be 
measured: what is it that aid is supposed to do? Taking ending world poverty as the ultimate goal 
only complicates the question because poverty is such a complex phenomenon that there is no 
clear, not to mention a single, cure to it.  There appears to be no unanimity on aid effectiveness 
among researchers, donors and aid recipients. This is on the one hand due to different perceptions 
on effectiveness and efficiency, and because of the (methodological) difficulties of measuring 
and identifying the impact of foreign aid, on the other. 
 
This apparent mixed evidence on aid effectiveness has eventually been contradicted by Hansen 
and Tarp (2000). Using an analytical framework to evaluate the existing aid effectiveness 
literature they conclude that, in the light of research done to date, there is a robust positive aid-
growth link. A recent study by Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2009) also shows that foreign aid indeed is 
effective. They state that “growth is the key objective of aid and must be evaluated as such”. 
They then add new insights to aid-growth debate by moving away from associational to causal 
inference1 and conclude that abolishing or significantly cutting back foreign aid would be a 
mistake. Hence the currently unresolved issue is not whether aid works, but how it  works  and  
whether there are differences between different aid modalities. 
 
This statement is further confirmed by Easterly2 in Reinventing foreign aid (2009), one of the 
latest contributions to the critical discussion on development aid. He claims that there is a general 
discontent with the existing aid system even though international aid is still seen as an important 
instrument in the fight against poverty. Despite the agreement that the current aid system is not 
                                                  
1 The authors extend previous research by identifying and evaluating potential outcomes, or counterfactuals. 
Identifying plausible counterfactuals has been a major empirical evaluation challenge. 
2 Former World Bank economist, currently Professor of Economics at New York University. 
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working very well there is international consensus that still more aid is needed. Given that 
controversial evidence on aid ineffectiveness prevails in the media3 while more and more aid is 
flowing from rich to poor countries, it is more important than ever to assess how exactly aid 
works and which aid instruments are most efficient in helping the world’s poorest people 
(Hansen & Tarp 2000, 22). 
 
Fundamentally foreign aid is about rich people giving money to the poor, which means that those 
who benefit from aid financed services are not the ones who pay for it. In addition, money is not 
directly handed over to the poor but there is at least one government, nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) or aid agency in between, and each of them probably having their own 
interests. Aid agencies are accountable to the rich whose money they are distributing, rather than 
to the poor who are eventually receiving it. In assessing aid effectiveness this has created 
incentives for aid agencies to emphasize facts visible to the rich country public rather than real, 
less observable results.4 
 
Consequently a concern has arisen about other possible effects of foreign aid – especially 
regarding its fiscal impact: the interaction between aid and the recipient country government’s 
fiscal behavior. The fact that most aid goes to the government and hence inevitably through the 
political decision making process, has not been properly taken into account. The centrality of 
fiscal effects is further emphasized by suspects and preliminary empirical evidence that there 
exists a link between foreign aid, increased public spending and reduced tax effort. (McGillivrey 
& Morrissey 2001; Mayr 2010.) However the link between foreign aid and excess public 
borrowing has not been thoroughly assessed to date.  
 
Objective of the study and research questions  
Aid affects macro economy through several channels. For example, the impact through savings 
and investment has been studied by Papanek (1972, 1973), aid-policy link by Boone (1996) and 
Burnside and Dollar (1997). The latest findings confirm that aid has positive impact on economic 
growth. However, aid effectiveness does not tell us anything about the mechanisms through 
                                                  
3 Also the Finnish media have recently reported on several negative comments concerning foreign aid giving. 
4 For example Svensson and Reinikka (Easterly 2009) have gained field experience in some practical measures to 
enhance visibility of results. 
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which aid has positive or negative effects. Moreover there is not only one kind of aid but various 
aid modalities, or instruments, and the current trend is to move away from the traditional forms of 
aid. Since the issue has not yet been addressed, it is interesting to look whether aid modality 
matters in effective aid delivery.  
 
Besides foreign aid, another topic that has attracted attention is unsustainable fiscal policies in 
developing countries. Sustained budget deficits and large stocks of public debt are viewed as 
important contributors to persistent poverty (Afonso & Rault 2010; Mayr 2010). Supported by 
some empirical evidence, large amounts of aid are also suspected to lead to excess public 
borrowing (McGillivray & Morrissey 2001; Easterly 2002; Mayr 2010). Insofar the relationship 
has been brought into light in the fiscal response literature5 but there are no comprehensive 
studies on the subject, which makes it another interesting and relevant topic. 
 
With  these  premises,  this  thesis  will  look  at  both  issues  -  how  aid  works  and  whether  aid  
modality matters from the perspective of fiscal discipline.  
 
The research questions are: 
 
1. What are the mechanisms that determine how different aid modalities affect fiscal discipline?  
2. Is budget support associated with greater fiscal discipline than off-budget aid?  
 
The objective of the thesis is twofold. To answer the first question, it aims to explore 
theoretically how government behavior alters as a response to foreign aid. As the fiscal discipline 
research done so far - fungibility and fiscal response studies - looks at the effect of aid on the 
structure of public finances only, the framework is inadequate in determining the underlying 
mechanisms. Therefore a new theoretical approach will be used. 
 
An empirical approach is used to answer the second question, where fiscal discipline is measured 
in terms of public debt sustainability. More precisely, the empirical section attempts to assess 
whether a country has a more sustainable debt level when it receives new kind of budget support 
                                                  
5 An overview of fiscal response studies follows in section 3. 
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(unconditional aid that is directed to the aid receiving government’s budget) than when it receives 
traditional, off-budget aid (aid that is not disbursed to the government budget). The second 
research question deviates from the usual approach, as it differentiates between aid modalities. As 
the evidence on the aid-borrowing-link refers to overseas development assistance (ODA) in 
general, without separating the impact of various aid modalities, it is important to look whether 
aid modalities differ in this respect. 
 
The motivation for differentiating aid modalities in terms of on- and off-budget aid lies in the 
centrality of the topic in the development aid discussion, mostly among practitioners. Foreign aid 
has been under a lot of criticism and its effectiveness in the traditional, off-budget form has been 
widely questioned (e.g. Easterly 2009; Koeberle & Stavreski 2006). 
 
Structure and methodology 
The first chapter sets a background for the study. A brief literature review introduces to the 
ongoing discussion on development aid and fiscal behavior, and discusses how the approach to 
aid effectiveness has changed hand in hand with political changes. Different aid instruments 
relevant for the thesis are presented. The focus on fiscal behavior will be further motivated in the 
light of aid dependence, which occurs as long periods of foreign aid inflows alter institutions and 
incentives in the aid receiving country. The second chapter introduces the special characteristics 
of foreign aid giving today. 
 
Even though insufficient in explaining how government fiscal behavior changes as a response to 
foreign aid, the current attempts to theoretically and empirically assess the fiscal impact of aid 
will be briefly presented in the third chapter. This is to show both the importance of the topic as 
well as the difficulties encountered in the field of research. 
 
In the fourth chapter a theoretical model on fiscal behavior will be built to show how aid distorts 
incentives to maintain fiscal discipline, and how putting aid on budget strengthens the political 
decision making process (budget process), which is a major contributor to fiscal discipline. The 
theoretical framework draws from political economy and public finance literature that have 
studied the link between budget process and budget deficits. The purpose of the theoretical 
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approach is to explain how budget support increases accountability and ownership of the 
receiving country government, and so helps solve the problems arising from both donor and 
receiving country behavior. The theoretical model does not include foreign aid in its original 
form but, as it will be explained, the kind of fiscal behavior predicted by the framework is 
assumed to result also in the context of development aid due to an analogy between budget 
processes.  
 
The link between different aid modalities and fiscal discipline is empirically assessed in the fifth 
chapter, where public sector debt sustainability is taken as a measure of fiscal discipline. 
Sustainable primary balances are computed for 11 Sub-Saharan African countries before and 
after they started receiving general budget support (GBS). The results obtained indicate that most 
sample countries’ fiscal discipline has slightly improved after they started to receive GBS. 
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes and suggests further research topics. 
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1 From development aid to economic growth 
 
This chapter begins with a presentation of different development aid instruments and defines the 
core concepts used throughout the thesis. It then continues with a brief historical overview on 
foreign aid giving. It is essential to consider the changing approach to aid giving because the 
purpose of foreign aid naturally determines how its effectiveness has been evaluated.  
 
1.1 Foreign aid in a changing political environment 
What exactly is foreign aid and what are its different forms? OECD’s Development Assistance 
Committee’s (DAC) glossary defines aid activity as “projects and programs, cash transfers, 
deliveries of goods, training courses, research projects, debt relief operations and contributions to 
non-governmental organizations”. The terms development aid and foreign aid will be used 
interchangeably throughout the text referring to this kind of aid activity in developing countries.  
 
The term Official Development Assistance (ODA) is “used in measuring the inflow of resources 
to recipient countries”, and includes grants, loans and contributions in cash and in kind. The 
traditional forms of aid include project and program aid that provide financing for specific 
projects; technical assistance, whereby the donor supports the receiving country by providing it 
with staff with certain technical skills, knowledge and knowhow; and food aid, which is mostly 
delivered as emergency aid.   
 
Aid can be either earmarked or non-earmarked. Earmarking ties the aid to a predetermined 
expenditure category. There are three disbursement channels of foreign aid (Mokoro 2008, 7). 
First, earmarked and non-earmarked aid can be disbursed through the channel normally used for 
government’s own-funded expenditures. In this case aid is disbursed to the finance ministry or 
treasury that further redistributes it to the ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs) 
responsible for the budget execution. The second channel goes directly to MDAs. Aid is then 
managed outside of the regular government system and does not follow the normal government 
procedures.  The third option is that expenditure is undertaken either by the donor agency or by 
non-government agents.  
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Off-budget aid is either not at all disbursed via government or does not follow regular 
government channels. Alternatively all different aid modalities, such as project aid, program aid, 
technical assistance and aid in kind can be on budget, which means that aid is disbursed to the 
country’s government.  
 
The term budget support refers to a lump sum transfer of foreign exchange. Budget support can 
further be subdivided into general budget support (GBS) and sector budget support, their 
difference lying in the extent of earmarking and conditionality. General budget support is not 
earmarked to a sector or expenditure category and comes without conditionality. 
 
Aid is said to be conditional when aid disbursement depends on the fulfillment of some 
predetermined requirements such as trade policy, structural reforms, democratization etc. Foreign 
aid is given for various reasons and the rationale for aid giving has changed over time. Also aid 
modalities have changed several times since the beginning of development assistance circa forty 
years ago. Foreign aid as an institution began in 1947 with the Marshall plan in Europe. 
Developing countries have been receiving foreign aid since the 1970s. The connection between 
development aid, i.e. money inflows to developing countries, and the Marshall plan was the 
underlying idea that countries suffering from poverty lacked investment needed for economic 
growth. Therefore industrial countries started to provide funds for investment projects in form of 
project aid. A strategy based on the successful Marshall plan in Europe did not work for the 
developing countries that lacked previous economic growth and pre-existing infrastructure. 
(Castrén 2003.)  
 
A major change has been a shift from financing specific projects or sectors of the society to 
providing countries budget support. This trend has resulted from changes in international political 
environment and relationships. During the cold war the presence of the Western Countries in the 
Third World is mainly explained by political interests of donor countries. Nowadays receiver 
countries are perceived more as partners, whose own interests are to be respected and taken better 
into account in allocating funds (Castrén 2003). The purpose is to increase the ownership of the 
receiver countries’ governments by respecting countries’ sovereignty.   
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The failure of the traditional forms of aid (mainly project and program aid) in reducing poverty in 
the Third World has been widely acknowledged. In the policy research report Assessing aid, the 
World Bank (1998) takes a critical overview on its own history as aid provider and on aid 
effectiveness. The rationale for the report was the general questioning of the existence of aid in a 
world of integrated capital markets where finance for investments is available on the markets.  
The report concludes that financial transfers from rich to poor countries are still needed but their 
modalities have to change for aid to be effective.  
 
The key findings emerging from the research are that effective aid requires right timing and 
allocation of funds to promote sound policies and governance. Thereby institutions have been 
found to play a central role in aid effectiveness. On the one hand, in a country where economic 
policies are being reformed, assistance is needed to increase benefits of reform as well as to 
maintain political support. On the other hand finance has little impact before countries reform. 
Aid was found to be effective in countries with sound management, while distorted environments 
have to rely on other instruments to support development. (World Bank 1998.) 
 
The focus has thus shifted from the narrow evaluation of projects to allocating resources, both 
finance and knowledge, to stimulate policy reforms and institutional changes that contribute to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction. However, also the approach to promote reform 
changed as making aid conditional on reform failed to deliver desired results. Multilateral donor 
organizations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular, had 
based their assistance on the so-called Washington consensus, which consists of a variety of 
measures aiming at structural reforms such as exchange rate devaluation, cutting inflation and 
budget deficits, and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The underlying idea is that 
sustainable macroeconomic development and free trade lead to economic growth, which in turn is 
the key to poverty reduction.  
 
Critics of aid conditional on structural reform (Bhagwati 2000; Stiglitz 2002; Svensson 2002) 
point out that the approach failed to recognize countries’ differing problems and characteristics. 
Reforms were imposed before the rest of the society was ready and without consideration of the 
specific kind of reforms needed in each country – different problems require distinct solutions. 
11 
 
Free trade failed to deliver the desired outcome by the same token: trade liberalization in 
developing countries cannot effectively contribute to economic growth if at the same time access 
to international markets is denied or trade barriers are maintained.   
 
1.2 The role of fiscal policy  
Talking about fiscal policy means focusing on one specific aspect of how aid affects policy, 
namely its impact on fiscal aggregates. This is a prerequisite for understanding macroeconomic 
effectiveness, or how aid promotes economic growth (McGillivray & Morrissey 2000.) The big 
question whether aid is a decisive factor in economic development and under what conditions is 
still unresolved (Arndt, Jones & Tarp 2009). A variety of approaches have been used to assess aid 
effectiveness, but the conclusions drawn are heavily dependent on theoretical frameworks, data 
sets, behavioral assumptions and econometric methods (Easterly 2009; McGillivray & Morrissey 
2001). 
 
There are at least two reasons for paying attention to fiscal policy in the context of economic 
growth and poverty reduction. First of all, fiscal policy is about decisions on public expenditure 
allocation and its finance. Second, fiscal behavior can be sustainable or not. In other words it can 
either undermine or promote economic growth and further increase or reduce poverty, 
respectively.  
 
According to growth theory aid’s impact on growth depends on how it affects savings, 
investment and government behavior in the economy. Most of the aid recipients are low-income 
countries where aid is still the principal source of revenue, often comparable to tax revenues in 
size, and therefore aid has a major impact on growth. (McGillivray & Morrissey 2001, 1.) In 
addition, as most aid goes to the public sector, its impact on growth and poverty-reduction 
depends essentially on how it influences government behavior. These two facts make government 
the most important factor contributing to growth in aid receiving low-income countries.  
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Table 1: Share of ODA of CG expense in selected Sub-Saharan countries 2007/2008 
 
Government behavior naturally translates into policy; with emphasis on fiscal policy. Fiscal 
policy affects poverty through two channels: growth and distribution (McKay 2002). It plays a 
key role in obtaining sustained economic growth and is a main mechanism to influence 
distribution through public spending and revenue raising decisions. Together these two aspects of 
fiscal policy can lead to pro-poor pattern of growth.  
 
A central challenge in assessing fiscal policy’s poverty reducing ability is that poverty is multi-
dimensional. This means that poverty consists of many aspects that are most likely influenced by 
several factors. Fiscal policy also includes various types of public expenditure and finance. The 
way one component of fiscal policy affects one aspect of poverty is rarely straightforward. 
McKay (2002, 2) points out that not only the nature of public spending (allocation of funds, 
consumption vs. investment etc.) affects poverty but also the way the expenditure is financed. 
Consequently considering an increase in the overall level of public spending while ignoring the 
way  it  is  financed  is  meaningless  because  the  two  may  well  affect  in  completely  opposite  
directions. Financing public expenditure through deficit or taxation always involves decisions on 
who will bear the consequences such as increased tax burden, inflation, interest rates, debt 
burden. These financing measures will have different poverty impacts.  
                                                  
6 Expense is cash payments for operating activities of the government in providing goods and services (World Bank 
Development Indicators online). 
2007 % 2008 % 
Niger 108,4 Burkina Faso 98,2 
Madagascar 108,4 Uganda 76,3 
Burkina Faso 101,3 Togo 75,3 
Mali 97,7 Benin 64,3 
Uganda 85,9 Cape Verde 53,3 
Cape Verde 43,9 Kenya 20,9 
Zambia 38,1 Lesotho 17,2 
Togo 27,7 Cote d'Ivoire 14,7 
Ghana 26,1 Mauritius 6,1 
Kenya 24,9 Seychelles 4,4 
Lesotho 17,5 South Africa 1,3 
 
Aid covers a significant share of government 
revenue especially in the poorest aid-dependent 
countries. Table 1 illustrates the percentage 
share of Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) of central government (CG) expense6 in 
a number of poor sub-Saharan countries.  ODA 
is net aid and equals aid disbursements minus 
repayments of principal. 
 
 
Source of data: World Bank Development Indicators Online  
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Assessing the direct and indirect effects of fiscal policy in quantitative terms is extremely 
difficult. The major methodological problem lies in identifying the counterfactual: what would 
have happened without a certain policy measure? Because of this difficulty most analyses focus 
on determining who receives the benefits of existing public spending, without answering the 
crucial question why exactly some groups benefit and others do not. Moreover this so-called 
benefit-incidence analysis fails to consider behavioral responses, which means understanding 
how behavior changes as a result of a determined fiscal policy measure.  
 
The benefit-incidence analysis has been the most often opted technique because of its relatively 
modest data requirements and relatively easy calculations. There are great differences in the data 
collected by government ministries and they hardly contain relevant information for poverty 
impact assessment purposes, such as on the living conditions of the beneficiaries. Incorporating 
behavioral responses requires a modeling approach and more complex data but is fundamental to 
consider the counterfactual, or to explore how behavior would have differed if fiscal policy had 
been different. (McKay 2002.) 
 
Therefore to fully understand the impact of aid on growth and poverty, it is essential to assess 
government’s role as a mediator in the aid delivery and effectiveness process. In this regard there 
is a deficiency in the aid-growth literature as it does not explicitly recognize that aid is mainly 
given to the government and consequently its impact in the economy will be mediated by 
government behavior.  
 
Traditionally aid effectiveness is studied as policy’s impact on aid rather than considering how 
aid itself affects policy. Aid fungibility literature addresses the question of allocation by studying 
the composition of government spending. As it is not informative enough about fiscal behavior, 
the focus has shifted on fiscal response studies that are concerned with modeling how public 
sector behavior affects the impact of aid. These models cover both the categorical allocation and 
the effects of aid on total public spending, taxation and borrowing. Although the effects of aid are 
complex, there is empirical evidence on increased government spending and borrowing as well as 
reduced tax effort associated with high levels of foreign aid (McGillivray & Morrissey 2001; 
Mayr 2010). 
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1.3 Aid dependence:  fiscal effects of long term aid 
 
1.3.1. Institutions and governance 
Since the very beginning of foreign aid giving there have been concerns about the negative 
effects of large scale money inflows on recipient countries’ government, its behavior and 
attitudes. Long periods of external aid financing have been found to alter institutions and 
incentives to maintain fiscal discipline. The term aid dependence was first introduced in the 
1970s when large money inflows were found to create institutional problems in aid receiving 
countries such as Bangladesh and Malawi. Bräutigam and Knack (2004, 257) define aid 
dependence as “a situation in which a government is unable to perform many of the core 
functions of government (…) without foreign aid funding and expertise”.  
 
Poor governance is often stated as the principal reason for many development problems in Africa 
(World Bank 1998), and includes concepts such as poor quality institutions, weak rule of law, 
absence of accountability, tight controls over information and corruption. Reasons for the crisis 
of governance are manifold and vary between countries: colonialism, economic crisis, 
unsustainable debt, civil wars and political instability. Even though these are probable reasons for 
poor governance, the fact that a lot of countries that receive large amounts of foreign aid are still 
characterized by these features has led researches to explore, whether aid itself contributes to 
poor governance rather than improves it, as intended.  
 
Aid itself as well as the aid delivery process have been claimed to create perverse incentives and 
informal institutions, not only in the country receiving large amounts of aid but also in the donor 
organization (Bräutigam & Knack 2004). These incentives and informal institutions such as 
patterns of behavior, norms and codes of conduct have been identified as worsening already poor 
governance, and they are noted to be fairly persistent and resistant to change7.  
 
On the other hand aid can contribute to better governance by providing funds needed to establish 
strong institutions, improve the quality of civil servants through higher salaries and build legal 
                                                  
7 Perverse incentives in the process of economic policymaking involve collective action problems like moral hazard 
and the tragedy of the commons. 
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systems and accounting offices. Traditionally one of the main purposes of aid has been to build 
effective institutions; so aid has been addressed to where most needed from this perspective. 
However, according to the prevailing view, aid is more effective in environments with sound 
institutions, and critics of large inflows have mostly focused on the absorption capacity of the 
poor countries, macro-economic impacts like the “Dutch disease”8 and the way aid volatility 
complicates budgeting. In contrast to the traditional doctrine, the existence of effective 
institutions has increasingly become a prerequisite for foreign aid. (Moss, Pettersson & van de 
Walle 2005, 5.) 
 
Moss et al. (2005) have studied yet another aspect of aid dependency, namely how aid reduces 
the willingness and ability of the government to collect state revenues. Since ability to collect 
revenues is a central task of democratic governance and fundamental to state operations, taxation 
is considered a key indicator of government capacity. The contemporary literature takes tax 
effort9 as determined by the level of development and economic structure.  The main measure of 
tax effort is GDP per capita as higher level of development is associated to a higher taxable 
surplus in the economy, better tax administration and ability to collect taxes, and finally a higher 
demand for public goods.  
 
From the fiscal impact point of view, the most interesting outcome of the tax effort literature is 
that foreign aid seems to reduce tax effort because it provides an alternative, non-earned source 
of revenue for governments. Once again researches point out the role of incentives; large amounts 
of free external funding reduce incentives to tax and to improve tax administration.  
 
1.3.2. Aid delivery process 
After a decline in foreign aid inflows in the 1990s, a number of studies suggest again a 
substantial increase in ODA to meet international development targets. These claims for more 
ODA are supported by several international parties such as the United Nations, the World Bank, 
many NGOs, recipient countries as well as some European governments. Further increasing aid 
                                                  
8 Inflows of foreign aid presumably raise the exchange rate, which makes the aid receiving country’s manufacturing 
sector less competitive. 
9 Tax effort is generally measured by GDP per capita, the degree of openness of the economy, the agricultural or 
industrial share of GDP and population growth. 
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inflows calls for a greater evaluation of the potential negative impacts of large scale transfers on 
political and state institutions in low-income countries. (Moss et al.2005, 8.) 
 
Table 2: Aid dependence. Net ODA/GNI ratios in selected Sub-Saharan countries  
Table  2  reports  the  share  of  ODA  of  
government revenues for selected sub-
Saharan countries. Net ODA/GNI ratio is 
often used as a proxy for aid-dependence. 
Net ODA equals aid disbursements minus 
repayments of principal. Low-income 
countries, where more aid is to be addressed 
already receive historically high amounts of 
aid. Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that 
presents the greatest challenges to 
development and is the most aid-dependent, 
serves to give a view of the volume of aid 
flows.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of data: World Bank Development Indicators Online 
 
The World Bank Development Indicators Online-database shows that on average Sub-Saharan 
Africa received ODA equivalent to 13,3 % of the GNI in 2007 and 14,2% in 2008 (excluding 
Somalia, for which ODA figures were not reported). In 2007 ODA amounted to more than 10 % 
of GNI in almost half of the regions 45 countries (excluding Somalia). In 7 countries ODA 
exceeded 20 % of GNI in year 2007. The 10 % threshold has been crossed in approximately three 
dozen countries in the world for a period of at least two decades. Both the time period and size of 
flows are historically without precedents (Bräutigam and Knack 2004).  
2007 % 2008 % 
Liberia 124,7 Liberia 185,8 
Burundi 48,6 Burundi 43,9 
Sierra Leone 33,5 Guinea-Bissau 31,6 
Guinea-Bissau 32,9 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 26,3 
Mozambique 24,2 Mozambique 22,0 
Sao  Tome  and  
Principe 23,8 Malawi 21,2 
Rwanda 21,3 Rwanda 19,3 
Malawi 20,8 Sierra Leone 19,2 
Tanzania 17,5 D.R. of Congo 15,5 
Uganda 14,4 Cape Verde 14,2 
Burkina Faso 14,1 
Central African 
Republic 13,0 
Mali 13,7 Ethiopia 13,0 
Ethiopia 13,4 Burkina Faso 12,6 
D.R. of Congo 12,9 Gambia 12,3 
Niger 12,8 Uganda 11,8 
Cape Verde 12,6 Tanzania 11,7 
Mauritania 12,4 Togo 11,4 
Madagascar 12,3 Mali 11,4 
Gambia 12,3 Niger 11,3 
Eritrea 11,5 Benin 9,6 
Central African  
Republic 10,4 Guinea 9,1 
Zambia 10,0 Madagascar 8,9 
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The current international aid system is characterized by a fragmentation of donors’ projects and 
agendas, impediment of learning and the impact on the budget process. High transaction costs 
result from donor competition for scarce staff in the receiving country.  Large amount of donors 
and projects creates substantial costs for public administration when the number of qualified civil 
servants is already low. Figure 1 reports the number of parallel implementation units (PIUs) in a 
number of Sub-Saharan countries in year 2007. 
 
Figure1: Number of PIUs in selected Sub-Saharan African countries, 2007 
 
 
Source of data: Paris Monitoring Survey 2008  
 
With an increase in the number of separate projects increases also the burden to public 
administration, since more time is spent on management of donor interest rather than promoting 
the development of the country. Furthermore, as most aid is received off budget so that it is not 
integrated into national budgets, aid-financed projects are often implemented through systems 
outside state structures. In order to do this, the most qualified staff is attracted by donors with 
extremely high salaries. (Bräutigam & Knack 2004, Moss et al. 2005, 7.) 
 
This means that many of the foreign aid’s costs to public administration are strictly related to aid 
delivery and administration from the donor side. These inadequacies of the aid system have been 
recently recognized among donors and some efforts to address the shortcomings are underway, 
such as donor pooling10 and budget support instead of project aid. Institutional attempts to 
improve the delivery process include the OECD-DAC programs and the Paris High Level Forum 
                                                  
10 Making the amount disbursed to each individual country dependent on its performance relative to competing 
countries (Svensson 2002, 383). 
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on Aid Harmonization and Alignment (Moss et al. 2005, 9). The existence of these inefficiencies 
is claimed to be a result of real political and bureaucratic constraints, the improvement of which 
seems to be very slow. In addition, Bräutigam and Knack (2004, 263) claim that there is a lack of 
incentives on both donors’ and recipients’ side to change current practices. They argue for rent 
seeking and corruption on recipient side; and political, ideological as well as commercial interests 
on donor side to surpass aid effectiveness as the final goal.  
 
A final, important concern about aid dependence is that long periods of aid flows alter the 
relationship between the government and citizens. External finance could shift government’s 
accountability from citizens to donors especially if they are the major providers of public finance. 
Even when aid disbursements are conditional on some predetermined requirements, these donor 
demands may be easier to fulfill than managing domestic revenue collection. (Moss et al. 2005, 
15.)  
 
That aid dependence creates moral hazard is  empirically  borne  out  by  Bräutigam  &  Knack  
(2004) and Knack (2000). Moral hazard is a situation, where an element of insurance induces 
riskier behavior. Applied to this context, it means that access to external resources induces 
undevelopmental behavior. The flow of state revenues is not dependent on government 
efficiency, which undermines incentives to improve government’s developmental capacity. When 
governing elites do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, they do not need the 
support of their publics or the assent of the legislatures either. Moral hazard operates both in the 
recipient government as well as within the donor organization.  
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2 From budget support to poverty reduction  
 
This chapter discusses reasons that have led to an increased emphasis on budget support instead 
of project aid and other forms of off-budget aid, and how putting aid on budget is thought to 
correct the problems of perverse incentives, donor fragmentation and the resulting high 
transaction costs, government’s lack of accountability and weakening institutions. 
 
2.1 What is general budget support (GBS)? 
Traditionally the most common development aid instruments have been conditional loans and 
grants to specific projects; justified by the claim that a lack of investment has been the principal 
constraint to development, and projects were seen as most efficient to capital investment delivery.  
 
Recently, particularly in Europe, bilateral donors have started to shift away from project aid to 
non-earmarked budget support. Also multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are increasingly moving away 
from the traditional, conditional, targeted support to more general budget support. This new way 
of aid delivery is remarkably different from the old arrangements of project-based or ex-ante 
conditionality imposing forms of aid. (Booth & Lawson 2004.) 
 
The main problems with off-budget projects are high transaction costs created by a large number 
of projects and donors, inefficient spending caused by donors’ ability to force their priorities, 
unpredictable funding levels due to problems in meeting the disbursement conditions, and non-
government project management structures that undermine the effectiveness of government 
systems. Aid projects working outside the government systems thus undermine the credibility 
and effectiveness of those systems. Also government ownership is reduced because project 
selection, approval and review processes are determined by the donor instead of the government. 
(Booth & Lawson 2004.) In addition, developing countries have often lacked resources to 
maintain the infrastructure put in place with project aid. 
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Booth and Lawson (2004) divide budget support into three subgroups: 
1. Direct budget support is a general definition, which refers to the channeling of donor funds in 
foreign currency to a partner government using its own allocation, procurement and 
accounting systems.  
2. General budget support (GBS) consists of financial assistance that contributes to the overall 
budget.  Funds may be nominally accounted for a certain sector but there is no formal 
limitation on their use.  
3. Sector budget support covers financial aid that is earmarked to a certain sector or sectors. 
 
The sometimes used name “partnership GBS” (PGBS) reflects the change in the perception of aid 
delivery in the 1990s. Until then aid delivery was strongly associated with imposing 
conditionality and structural adjustments. The dissatisfaction with this concept is incorporated in 
the word “partnership”, which emphasizes the ownership of the receiving country so that support 
is given to its own poverty reduction strategies. Direct disbursements to the government through 
its own national system are thought to strengthen national planning and implementation capacity 
and to further increase the effectiveness of public expenditure. (IDD 2006; Koeberle, Stavreski & 
Walliser 2006.) 
 
The inconsistent use of various terms and concepts is pointed out in one of the first systematic 
studies on budget aid (Mokoro 2008, 6). Confusion is created because aid is not always 
straightforwardly incorporated into the budget documents. Budgets also appear in several 
versions such as draft, final and amended as well as at different levels of administration, 
especially in decentralized systems.     
 
Because of the various definitions and the number of aid modalities, to avoid confusion, from 
now  on  the  term  general budget support (GBS) will be used for non-earmarked (to specific 
projects or expenditure items), i.e. completely fungible aid funding to government that is 
disbursed through the government’s own financial management system11. Perfect fungibility 
                                                  
11 Also the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland defines general budget support as non-earmarked, direct aid to 
the government budget. 
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means that the receiving country government uses its own allocation, procurement and 
accounting systems, even though there are a variety of disbursement channels.  
 
Until the late 1990s budget support was provided in the context of structural adjustment 
programs. Since year 2000 there has been a major change in thinking about budget support. The 
“new” GBS since 2000 is based on the idea that an effective government that is accountable to 
the citizens is a prerequisite for sustained poverty reduction. This is guaranteed by providing 
untied budgetary resources, relying on national policy processes and putting emphasis on 
institutional development in order to create accountable, capable governments. Predictable, 
transparent methods for external budget finance and the use of government systems and processes 
also minimizes transaction costs. (Booth & Lawson 2004.) In brief, budget support is simply 
about transferring resources to the recipient country government budget.  
 
Given the financial importance of budget support, it is striking that there has not yet been any 
formal evaluations of its effectiveness. This can be due to the novelty of the aid instrument, 
which in its current form has only been provided since year 2000. Most probably another 
essential reason is the difficulty of assessing causality and attribution as well as the requirement 
of a joint assessment of the effects by a large number of donors providing budgetary aid in a 
given country.  
 
2.2 How does GBS work?  
Booth and Lawson (2004) provide a model of how budget support contributes to poverty 
reduction (Figure 2). Their Evaluation Framework seeks to answer two questions: whether at the 
country level GBS is a relevant, efficient and effective aid modality for poverty reduction, and 
under what circumstances will GBS be more relevant, efficient, effective and sustainable than the 
same amount of aid in other forms. These criteria are consistent with those of the OECD-DAC in 
evaluation of development assistance: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impacts and 
sustainability of benefits.  
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However, as Nilsson (2004, 7) argues, the evaluation of GBS does not have to go all the way to 
poverty reduction because the ultimate responsibility of poverty reduction measures can be 
attributed to each single government, while the contribution of GBS in the process is the 
strengthening of the economic and institutional environment through improved public finance 
management. 
 
One of the outcomes of GBS identified by Booth and Lawson (2004) is an increased importance 
of the national budget, which has an impact on incentives such that it results as institutional 
effects. These effects primarily manifest themselves through empowerment of the partner 
government and an improved budget financing structure resulting from the predictability of 
budget funding, as well as increased fungibility of resources coming to the budget. Moreover 
GBS strengthens democratic accountability because of a greater role given to parliaments in 
monitoring budget results and spending. These outcomes eventually create stable macroeconomic 
environment, which is a precondition for private investment and economic growth.  
 
The Joint Evaluation of General Budget Support 1994-2004 (IDD 2006) is an independent 
assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of GBS in achieving sustainable poverty reduction 
and growth. The study was made in 2004 by a group of 24 aid agencies and 7 partner 
governments. Significant flows of GBS are delivered in Uganda, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, 
Rwanda and Vietnam. As main findings of interest, GBS was found to support increases in “pro-
poor” expenditures, fiscal discipline was supported by funds subject to the budget process, it 
helped strengthen the basis for accountability through improved transparency of public finance 
management, and strengthened government incentives because of its financial empowerment 
effects.  
 
In conclusion, putting aid on budget is justified on the grounds of public finance management and 
aid effectiveness. The field of public finance management emphasizes that since aid is an 
important source of public resources in many developing countries, aid management is a crucial 
determinant of the overall public finance management. Aid effectiveness literature on the other 
hand provides support for the claim that country ownership of strategy, and leadership of aid 
management are essential for aid to be effective (Mokoro 2008, 11). 
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Figure 2:  Booth & Lawson logical framework analysis of GBS 
 
Source: Booth and Lawson (2004) 
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3 Review of modeling fiscal behavior with aid  
 
The aid effectiveness literature that studies fiscal effects can be subdivided into two categories. 
Fungibility studies aim at assessing the expenditure categories of foreign aid, and whether they 
are consistent with donor intentions. This branch has mainly emphasized the donor viewpoint on 
aid  effectiveness.  As  part  of  the  discussion  on  fiscal  impact  of  aid,  the  basic  idea  of  the  
fungibility studies will be briefly presented. Major consideration will be given to the fiscal 
response literature, which is how the fiscal impact of aid is currently explained.  
 
3.1 Aid fungibility 
Many researchers such as Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990), Pack and Pack (1993), Feyzioglu, 
Swaroop and Zhu (1998), Pettersson (2007) have focused on the issue of aid fungibility, the 
importance of which arises from the traditional view that aid is provided to stimulate imports and 
investment. Aid is said to be fungible, if it is not used for the purposes intended by donors (OPM 
2003).  
 
Figure 2 below presents the basic framework of aid fungibility as adapted by Nilsson (2004, 13). 
Consider a country that spends its total resources on a single private good, Cp, and two public 
goods, G1 and G2. It pays all goods with its own money and receives foreign aid earmarked for 
the purchase of good G2.  
 
Without foreign aid, alternative allocation of funds between goods is presented by the line BB’. 
The utility curves represent the preferences of the country, which gives A as the optimal choice in 
the first case. In the second case, the country receives an amount F of earmarked foreign aid. 
Assume differing preferences for the donor and the receiving country. From the donor’s point of 
view the optimal choice is at point D, where the recipient spends all the additional funds on good 
G2, while the consumption of goods Cp and G1 has not changed. In this case, aid is fully non-
fungible.  
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Figure 3: Aid fungibility  
 
Source: Nilsson (2004) 
 
If, for some reason, the donor cannot monitor the public spending in the aid receiving country, 
the recipient can take the amount F additional to its own resources, which gives the new budget 
line B’C’C.  Now aid is fully fungible and the resources are allocated at point E, where the new 
budget line meets the optimal utility curve. At point E, the additional resources F are not entirely 
spent on good G2. Another possible allocation point would occur if aid were partially fungible. 
The recipient’s budget line would move out with the fungible part of the funds so that the 
consumption point would result between points D and E.  
 
This kind of analysis implies that when the donor and the recipient government have the same set 
of preferences, as in the first case, fungibility is not a problem and the provided funds are used 
exactly as intended by the donor. For example the previously mentioned Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are based on the assumption that values are shared. Cordella and 
Dell’Arricchia (2007) have studied the question of fungibility in a theoretical model and obtained 
similar results. Furthermore, the authors show that budget support is preferable to project aid 
(off-budget aid) when preferences are aligned and when the amount of funds provided is small 
relative to the recipient’s own resources.     
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McGillivray and Morrissey (2001) have shown in an analytical framework that researchers and 
donors should not be concerned about fungibility per se but instead address the more general 
question of how aid affects fiscal behavior, and the way spending plans are implemented. They 
call aid illusion a situation in which the implementing officials misperceive the intentions of the 
policy officials in charge of setting the expenditure plans. Fozzard and Foster (2001) argue that 
misperceptions can arise from inadequate information and weak public expenditure management 
systems (a principal-agent problem). 
 
The motivation behind the “aid illusion”- analysis is to enrich the earlier treatments of 
fungibility, which consider the interaction between donors and recipients without any distinction 
between officials who set the spending plans and those who implement them. Their principal aim 
is to illustrate the potential reasons behind the empirical finding that aid leads to a greater than 
proportional increase in total public spending in the recipient country (McGillivray & Morrissey 
2001, 119). Drawing on the public sector economics literature on fiscal illusion and preference 
revelation, the researchers present four theoretical scenarios that give rise to increased 
expenditure resulting from misperceptions or illusions regarding the real or nominal value of the 
aid inflow. The study puts emphasis on further research on the link between aid and borrowing, 
which arises from misperceptions or inefficiencies related to information inflow and monitoring 
in budgetary processes.  
 
The conclusion drawn in the paper is that many problems may stem from weak public 
expenditure management, but also from poor coordination and different aid administration 
processes by the donors. Fungibility is regarded as a problem related to differing preferences 
between the donor and the recipient, whereas aid illusion addresses the issue of inefficient 
allocation and monitoring processes of aid expenditures. (McGillivray & Morrissey 2001, 133.) It 
is thus argued that the emphasis on fungibility is misplaced and the attention should be shifted to 
budgetary inefficiencies that may encourage excess spending, which in turn can lead to 
borrowing and budget deficits. 
 
The increased interest in fungibility studies has been partly due to its prominent role in the 1998 
World Bank report Assessing Aid and also because of the concern of donors providing budget 
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support regarding the actual use of funds. However, the Assessing Aid report bases its 
conclusions mainly on the work of Feyzioglu et al. (1998), which has been widely questioned for 
an inadequate methodological approach.  
 
Furthermore, empirical studies on aid fungibility have come to ambiguous conclusions12 so that 
any definitive conclusions on aid effectiveness cannot be drawn (Nilsson 2004, 15). Critics of the 
fungibility studies argue that even though the composition of government spending may be a 
valid concern to donors interested in how their funds are spent, it cannot be considered as a 
central issue in the evaluation of how aid affects aggregate fiscal behavior. On the contrary, it is 
just one aspect among many. Because the policy implications of Assessing Aid have received a 
lot of attention, and general fungibility can in fact play a key role in aid effectiveness, this 
approach cannot be completely ignored.  
 
The fungibility approach is argued to be too narrowly focused on the composition of government 
spending, as it considers only one aspect of the impact of aid on the recipient government budget. 
As such it is not informative enough about fiscal behavior. In order to capture the wider effects of 
aid on behavior regarding total spending, taxation and borrowing, the attention of researchers has 
increasingly turned to fiscal response models. 
 
3.2 Fiscal response  
The fiscal response literature derives from Heller (1975) and models fiscal behavior to study the 
potential impact of foreign aid inflows on public finances. In specific, fiscal response models 
look at how different categories of government expenditure and revenue depend on foreign aid - 
the impact of aid through relieving the government budget constraint. 
 
Fiscal response models have been recognized to suffer from modeling problems due to weak data 
found in developing countries (Nilsson 2004, 16) and sensitivity to model specifications (OPM 
2003). Nonetheless the interest in fiscal response models persists, particularly for evaluating 
budget support, because of the common focus on internal account (accountability to parliament 
                                                  
12 For a critical review of the fungibility literature, especially on its role and insufficiency as an approach in 
Assessing Aid (World Bank 1998), see McGillivray and Morrissey (2000). 
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and taxpayers). The latest attempts to improve fiscal response modeling e.g. in Mavrotas (2002) 
and OPM (2003) include aid disaggregation; attempts to trace the specific effects of different 
types of aid and the effects of budget support through the government accounting system and 
decision making process in particular (Nilsson 2004, 16). 
 
Heller (1975) assumes revenue allocation among various expenditure categories subject to budget 
constraints to be the basic task of public sector decision makers. In the simplest model public 
expenditure is divided into two separate categories: recurrent and capital expenditure, which can 
be otherwise labeled as government consumption G and public sector investment Ig.  The  two  
sources of domestic revenue are taxation T and borrowing B. In the earlier fiscal response models 
aid A is treated as exogenous and it enters the budget constraint in form of external source of 
revenue. Public sector decision makers are assumed to be rational utility-maximizers. Then the 
public sector decision makers’ utility function can be represented as: 
 
? =  ? (??,?,?,?)     (1) 
 
Later contributors to the Heller approach have assumed that governments set targets for the 
various expenditure and revenue categories. Government utility is then maximized when those 
targets are met. For example, Mosley and Hudson, and Binh and McGillivray (1987; 1993 see 
McGillivray & Morrissey 2001, 12) represent the utility function (1) as a quadratic loss function: 
 
? =  ?? –  ???  (??– ???)?   –  ???  (?–  ??)?–  ???  (?– ??)?–  ???  (?– ??)?   (2) 
 
where the endogenous variables denoted by an asterisk (*) represent target levels and ?i > 0 for i 
= 1,…, 4.  It follows from (2) that government maximizes utility if it achieves all set targets and 
the maximum unconstrained value is ?0. In addition, when ?i > 0 marginal utility is diminishing 
for all levels of Ig, G, T and B. Also, the utility function is symmetric so that overshooting or 
undershooting the target results in a utility loss of the same proportion.13  
                                                  
13 According to Binh and McGillivray (1993) this claim can be too restrictive, as it seems more plausible that 
governments regard undershooting revenue targets more worrisome than overshooting. However, McGillivray and 
Morrissay (2001) add that there are political costs in obtaining revenue, while a revenue shortfall results in political 
costs related to a budget deficit. Thus, a priori, disutility can be taken symmetric for both expenditure and revenues.    
29 
 
The government budget constraint is given by the overall public sector budgetary constraint: 
 
??  +  ? =  ? +  ? +  ?     (3) 
 
which simply says that total expenditure cannot exceed total revenues. The above budget 
constraint (3) can be further decomposed into two separate constraints: 
 
??  = (1– ?? )? + (1 ?  ??) ? +  ?    (4) 
 
and 
 
? =  ??  ? +  ?? ?     (5) 
 
where (1–?1 ) represents savings from the recurrent budget and ?2 denotes the proportion of aid 
allocated to consumption spending.  
 
The government then maximizes U given in (2) subject to the constraints (4) and (5).  
 
The first important problem with this model is the interpretation of ?2 as the extent of fungibility 
of aid (McGillivray & Morrissay 2001, 13). Implicit in the model is the assumption that donors 
give aid only to finance investments, completely captured in Ig, so that ?2 = 0 ex ante, which 
makes the proportion ?2 of aid allocated to G an ex post measure of fungibility. It can be argued 
that there are expenditures belonging to G, such as social sector expenditures that donors are 
willing to support, ?2 > 0 ex ante makes the estimated value of ?2 a measure of maximum 
fungibility.  
 
Over-constraint of the model poses another significant problem of this representation. This means 
that the maximum value ?0 cannot necessarily be reached even when there are enough aid 
revenues to meet all the targets. Even though total revenue were sufficient for (3), the ? s 
constrain allocation and prevent the specific expenditure targets in (2) to be met.   According to 
McGillivray (2000), using only (3) as a budget constraint resolves the problem but results in 
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intuitively unrealistic structural equations.  The model presented here has been estimated by 
Gang and Khan (1991, see McGillivray & Morrissay 2001, 16) with time series data for India. 
However researchers have not reached consensus on the most appropriate way to model public 
sector behavior with aid inflows.  
 
In later models (Franco-Rodriquez, McGillivray & Morrissey 1998; McGillivray & Ahmed 1999, 
see McGillivray & Morrissay 2001), aid has been endogenized to capture the fact that disbursed 
aid actually is a choice variable for the recipient government. Following Franco-Rodriquez et al 
(1998), with endogenous aid the loss function (2) is replaced by: 
 
? = ?? –  ???  (??– ???)? – ???  (?– ??)?– ???  (?– ??)?– ???  (?–??)? ? ???  (?–??)?  (6)  
Endogenous aid means that governments have a target also for aid revenue and it is taken into 
account when deciding on revenue and expenditure allocations. It does not require that recipients 
control the amount of aid disbursed but they control the amount of aid spent. This reflects the 
evidence that recipients have choice over the amount disbursed or actually spent, and hence 
determine how aid is allocated among various expenditure headings.  
 
From the above reasoning it follows that in (6) A represents disbursements and A* commitments.  
Further, under-spending an aid commitment can be interpreted as limited absorptive capacity, 
which can lead to lower aid inflows in subsequent years. Overspending, on the other hand, 
reflects either previous limited absorptive capacity or emergency aid for that year.  
 
Maximizing (6) subject to (4) and (5) presents the same problem as in the case with exogenous 
aid. Similarly, maximizing subject to (3) alone implies no constraints on revenue allocation and, 
once again, results in complete fungibility. This cannot be taken as a realistic presentation of 
public sector fiscal behavior because of the various pressures facing fiscal decision-making. For 
example politicians, pressure groups and donors attempt to influence public sector revenue 
allocation. (McGillivary & Morrissey 2001, 14.) The influence of the pressure groups can be 
incorporated into the model by assuming the following constraint instead of (4) and (5): 
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 ?? ?  ??  ? +  ?? ?     (7) 
 
The above constraint captures the pressures on public sector fiscal behavior, which result in a 
suboptimal outcome with respect to the government’s own preferences. The inequality reflects 
the external constraints on public sector decision making in developing countries.  
 
According to Mavrotas (2002, 537), the major problem with the pre-existing empirical studies 
has been the employment of a single figure for aid, which can lead to inadequate conclusions on 
aid effectiveness. This leads to two main shortcomings. Firstly, different types of aid operate in 
different ways in the aid receiving country and can have different macro effects. Secondly, the 
proportions of different types of aid are changing in different degrees between countries, which 
will distort the empirical results.  
 
Consequently Mavrotas (2002) has been the first to further develop the fiscal response models to 
better take into account the heterogeneous character of foreign aid. He first disaggregates aid 
flows in three different categories: project aid, program aid and technical assistance; and then 
estimates the model for India and Kenya. He assumes the aid-recipient government utility 
function similar to (2) and takes aid exogenous. 
 
The problem with this kind of analysis is that the model only depicts accounting relationships. 
The estimated coefficients reveal the extent of fungibility of foreign aid but causal inferences 
cannot be made. Also the derivation of the target variables is problematic as the value of the 
targets cannot be observed. The targets have to be approximated because of lack of data on actual 
values, and an established theory on target determination. (Mavrotas 2002, 543.) The latest model 
with disaggregated aid (OPM 2003) includes food aid and endogenous aid. Contrary to many 
previous studies, the model also allows government to borrow for consumption purposes.   
 
The results obtained in the literature can be relevant for assessing whether public resources are 
used efficiently in terms of the well-being of the poor, but the existing fiscal response models are 
still inadequate to assess any causality. Without any assessment of causality, the fiscal response 
models tell very little about how the government fiscal behavior actually “responds” to foreign 
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aid. In addition, in the light of the current tendency to move away from sector, program and 
project aid towards budget support, it can be questioned, whether the way aid is disaggregated in 
the models actually adds any relevant information for decision makers.        
 
The existing literature on aid effectiveness is mainly criticized for three weaknesses (McGillivray 
& Morrissey 2001; OPM 2003). First, the models used are inadequate to capture all the channels 
and mechanisms through which aid affects macroeconomic outcomes. Second, inappropriate 
econometric methodology has been used so that lag structures and misspecification issues are 
ignored. Third, the composition of aid together with the varying impact of different forms of aid 
has been neglected. As McGillivray and Morrissey (2001, 3) point out in their critical review on 
the theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal effects of aid, different theoretical frameworks, 
data sets, behavioral assumptions and econometric models have provided a variety of results and, 
consequently, different policy implications.  
 
Most importantly, the way in which aid affects macroeconomic outcomes depends on the 
complicated relationship between aid, the policy environment and institutional environment 
(Nilsson 2004, 17). Jones and Shaw (OPM 2003) have also argued that development assistance 
leads to development outcomes through three channels: the government budget constraint, policy 
and institutions. Fiscal response looks at only one of them; the government budget constraint, 
while the two other channels, policy and institutions, are not included in the analysis. 
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4 Theoretical explanation to fiscal discipline 
 
After presenting aid fungibility and fiscal response studies that look at the impact of aid on the 
structure of public finances, this section builds a theoretical model to formally explain the 
mechanism behind fiscal (in)discipline with different aid modalities. How does government 
behavior alter as a response to foreign aid? 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, aid is found to affect fiscal behavior and promote fiscal indiscipline in 
two ways: it creates perverse incentives and weakens institutions. Collective action problems, 
such as the tragedy of the commons, moral hazard and free rider problems, capture the distorted 
incentives that hinder the creation of a responsive, capable state and an effective foreign aid 
system (Bräutigam & Knack 2004). In the literature on political economy and public finance, 
excess deficits in the industrialized countries have been explained by collective action problems. 
The literature emphasizes the quality of the budget process, where political decision making takes 
place.  
 
The same approach is now used here to show formally how and why foreign aid as a means to 
finance public expenditure may generate incentives and opportunities for increased government 
spending, and to explain why off-budget aid could lead to greater fiscal indiscipline than direct 
aid to the government budget. 
 
4.1 The common pool 
In a politically decentralized country local officials are chosen locally and are assigned to make 
decisions on important policy issues (Treisman 2008, 3). There are various ways to model the 
effects of political decentralization on central government redistribution and fiscal policy. 
Political economists have started to explain excessive budget deficits as a common pool or 
common property resource (CPR) problem, where there is overutilization of national wealth as is 
the case of any common resource (Poterba & von Hagen 1999).   
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The common-property approach to fiscal politics was first introduced by Weingast, Shepsle, and 
Johnsen (1981) and later extended by many others such as von Hagen (1998) and Velasco (1998, 
2000). In some models the common resource can generate suboptimal outcomes from the point of 
view of political actors like legislators. In others the outcome is suboptimal for citizens due to 
fiscal illusion (Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen 1981) or due to principal-agent problems in the 
relation between the people and their representatives (Tommasi & Weinschelbaum 2007).   
 
Von Hagen (1998) has studied fiscal discipline in terms of budget deficit within the common 
property-framework and argues that the key determinant of the fiscal performance of 
governments is the quality of the budget process. The budget process is crucial because 
budgeting requires that all conflicts between competing claims on public finances are resolved 
during the budgeting process. Four deviations undermine the functioning of the budget process: 
off-budget funds, non-decisions (expenditures in the budget determined by developments 
exogenous to the budget process), mandatory spending (laws other than the budget make some 
government expenditures compulsory) and contingent liabilities (e.g. guarantees for the liabilities 
of other public or non-public entities).   
 
Also Velasco (2000) develops a political-economic model of fiscal policy with government 
resources as a common pool that interest groups use to finance expenditures. The interest groups 
share the same central government budget constraint. The model shows that transfers are higher 
than socially optimal and lead to fiscal deficits even when there is no incentive for intertemporal 
smoothing. An essential assumption of the model is a weak government that satisfies the interest 
groups’ bids. The spending bias results from the divergence of benefits and costs: each group 
benefits fully from its own spending while the costs are spread over all groups. The novelty of the 
model is that it exhibits a deficit bias in a situation where the government should run a balanced 
budget (when intertemporal smoothing is not needed). Deficit arises from the strategic interaction 
among competing groups in a context of decentralized fiscal policymaking, where interest groups 
share access to government resources. (Velasco 2000, 122.)  
 
The presentation on political decentralization follows Treisman (2008). Local officials view the 
central budget as a common pool from which to draw as large transfers to their own districts as 
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possible. The central government is assumed to care only for being in power and not for the 
policy per se. It is thus precommited to implement whichever policy promised. This ensures that 
the central government can credibly commit to a predetermined expenditure level. Like Velasco, 
also Treisman assumes that local governments can persuade the central government to satisfy 
their demands. Local government in Treisman’s model can be substituted by spending units such 
as ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs) responsible for the budget execution, the term 
previously used in the discussion on development aid. 
 
A country is divided into n = 1, 2, …, N MDAs, each receiving an income y and paying a lump 
sum tax T. Central government (CG)  transfers to an MDA are denoted rn and are used to finance 
each MDA’s public expenditure gn. The central transfers in turn are financed with taxes. In other 
words taxes are collected by the CG and reallocated as transfers to MDAs. Budgeting consists of 
choosing the expenditure level (i.e. supply of public services) for each MDA given the budget 
constraint. Consider a budget process where each MDA chooses the expenditure level given the 
choice of the others and the central government budget.  
 
Each MDA thus maximizes a payoff function: 
 
??  = ?(??)  +  ? –  ?      (8) 
 
where ?’ > 0 , ?’’ < 0, ?(0) = 0, lim
?? ?
?’(?) = ?   
 
subject to the CG budget constraint  
 
? ??? =  ? ??? = TN       (9) 
 
Equilibrium spending by each MDA is then given by the first order condition: 
 
??(???) =  ??      (10) 
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The perceived price for an increase in the level of expenditure by an MDA is 
?
?
. Since the MDAs 
are identical, they all choose the same level of expenditure.  
 
Instead, if each MDA had to bear the full cost of its spending and finance it with a lump sum tax, 
there would be no reallocation of funds and each MDA would then be maximizing (8) subject to 
the MDA budget constraint  
 
??  =  ?     (11) 
 
The equilibrium condition given by the first order condition would be: 
 
??(??? ) = 1     (12) 
 
which is more efficient than (10), because spending in (10) is higher than in (12), given N > 1.  
 
In the first case excess spending in an MDA results from perceived marginal cost of spending 
lower than the increase in expenditure: each MDA pays only 
?
?
 of a dollar spent, while in the 
second case each MDA bears the full cost of its expenditure by paying the true price of an 
increase in the level of expenditure. Marginal cost of spending is lower in (10) than in (12). 
 
The CPR problem results from a coordination failure because the decision makers in the process 
fail to take into account the full cost of their spending. Von Hagen (1998, 10; von Hagen & 
Harden 1995) calls this lack of a comprehensive view of the cost implication of spending 
decisions fragmentation of the budget process, whereas in a centralized budget process the 
spending decisions are fully coordinated so that the individual decision makers are forced to take 
a comprehensive view of the budget. It is important to note that the aim is not to question the 
assignment of expenditure responsibilities to spending units other than the central government 
but to focus on the budgeting process, which determines expenditure levels and their finance.  
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As  the  CG  is  assumed  weak,  it  is  itself  subject  to  the  common  pool  problem.  With  external  
finance, like foreign aid, the spending units bear no part of the expenditure. A logical solution to 
a CPR problem would be to reduce the vertical fiscal gap (the ratio of central transfers to total 
revenues in the locality), which means that local expenditure is fully financed by local revenues. 
This would make the divergence of private (local) and social (national) opportunity costs 
disappear (Pisauro 2001, 4).  
 
However, the coexistence of a CPR and a moral hazard problem leads to a situation where 
decentralization (reducing the fiscal gap) does not incentivize to operate under the right budget 
constraint either. The local spending units perceive external finance (central government transfers 
for MDAs and foreign aid at the CG level) as insurance in case of default. External finance thus 
disincentivizes to bear the full cost of collecting revenues, affects the budgeting decisions and 
decreases local accountability. 
 
4.2 The soft budget constraint 
Soft budget constraint is a consequence of the problem of moral hazard, where external finance 
such as foreign aid introduces an insurance element that will affect the budgeting decisions of the 
spending units. It is another way to illustrate how the divergence of costs and benefits affects 
accountability as local spending units can pressure the central government to make unplanned 
fiscal transfers. In other words soft budget constraint appears when the access to external 
resources such as foreign aid convinces decision makers that budgets are flexible, and so 
encourages fiscal indiscipline.  
 
The simple model of soft budget constraints follows Treisman14 (2008). 
 
Consider a state divided into three identical local units (spending units, MDAs) n = 1, 2, 3 with a 
fixed population size normalized to one. Each local government levies a local income tax at rate 
?n, while a central government sets a national income tax, T. Assume identical objectives for the 
                                                  
14 The model developed by Treisman is based on Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (2001, see Treisman 2008). 
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MDAs and central governments that match those of the citizens. An MDA’s payoff function is 
given by: 
 
?? = ?(??) +  (1? ?? ?  ?)??      (13) 
 
where gn is expenditure on public goods and services in locality n, yn is total income in locality n, 
?’ > 0 , ?’’ < 0, ?(0) = 0, lim
?? ?
?’(?) = ?. The central government’s payoff is ?? + ??  + ?? . The central government can finance spending in local units by transfers, rn. Taxes induce 
distortions in economic activity (and nondistortionary taxes are not available) so that income is 
decreasing in tax rate ?? = ?(?? +  ?),   ? ? < 0 and no one works at tax rate 1: y(1) = 0.    
     
Consider first the outcome under centralization, where the central government makes policy 
decisions for the country. The central government sets {?? , ??, ??,?} for all n to maximize: 
 
?? + ??  +  ??        (14) 
 
subject to the budget constraint:       
 
??  +  ??  +  ??  =  (? +  ??)??  +  (? +  ??)??  +  (? +  ??)??   (15) 
 
The FOCs give the equilibrium under centralization ??
?   and imply that  
 
??
? ?  ??? ? ???        (16) 
        
 
and that 
??(???) = ?? ?  (1 ?  ??? ?  ??)????? + (??? +  ?? )???   
            (17) 
for n= 1, 2, 3     
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Rewriting (17) shows that when the government chooses to raise taxes it trades off the marginal 
benefit against the marginal cost, while also considering the distortionary effects of the taxes. In 
(18) the marginal benefit from increased public spending is on the left-hand side, while the right-
hand side measures the marginal cost in terms of loss in decreased private consumption.    
      
??(???)   ?(??? + ??)???(??  + ?)  = ?  ?(? ? ??? ???)??  ?(??  + ?)  
(18) 
 
 
Rearranging (17):    
??(???)[?? + (?? +  ?)?? ’] 
?? –  (1 –  ?? –  ?)?? ’  
         
and assuming15 2(??? )?  > ?????? everywhere for all n there is a unique point 0  < ?? + ? < 1  at 
which tax revenues are maximized. With this additional assumption, since (17) decreases 
monotonically in (?? + ?), there is at most one solution. If there is a solution it must be true that 
??
?  =  ???  =  ??? ?  ??  and in equilibrium the expenditure level in each locality is: 
 
??? = (?? +  ??)?(?? + ??)     (19) 
 
Consider now the case under decentralization, where local spending units first commit to a policy 
variable, say the level of spending ?? . Thus, at time 1 the spending units move simultaneously 
and play a Cournot game against each other. At time 2, the CG sets the levels of transfers ??and a 
central tax rate T, subject to the central budget constraint:  
 
?? +  ?? +  ?? = ?(?? +  ?? +  ??)    (20) 
  
whereas the local tax rates are residually solved from the local budget constraints: 
                                                  
15This is derived from maximizing (? + ?)?(? + ?)and plugging in the FOC ?+ (? + ?)? ? = 0.  
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?? =  ???? + ??,   ? = 1, 2, 3    (21) 
 
The game is solved by backward induction, where local units have the first move as they commit 
to an expenditure level.  
 
A time 2 the CG sets {r, T} to maximize    
 
??  +  ??  + ??  = ? (?(??) + ?1 – ??(??)–  ??????(??  +  ? )? ????   (22) 
 
subject to 
??  =  ????  + ??, ? = 1, 2, 3  
and  
?? +  ?? +  ?? = ?(?? + ?? + ??)    
 
The FOCs under decentralization are: 
        ?? –  ?1 – ???  –  ??????  
?? +  ???? +  ?????? = ?? – ?1 – ???  –  ??????  ?? +  ???? +  ?????? = 
            (23)  ?? –  (1 –  ???  – ??)???  
?? + (??? +  ??)??? =  ?               
 
where ? = Lagrange multiplier for the CG’s budget constraint under decentralization and which 
implies same local tax rates across localities in the equilibrium 
 
??
? ?  ??     (24) 
 
as well as same output levels  
 
?? = ?? =  ??  = ?(?? +  ??)    (25) 
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The CG first observes the levels of spending and then chooses the allocation of transfers to adjust 
for the tax-induced distortion. The higher the spending levels set by a local unit, the higher will 
be the transfer to that locality.  
 
At time 1, the local spending units maximize (13) subject to the central government’s reaction 
function, which is a combination of the central AND local budget constraints, given ??? ?  ??: 
 
??  +  ?? + ??  = 3(?? +  ??)?(?? +  ??)   (26) 
 
As each local unit takes the others’ expenditure levels as given, it sees (?? +  ??) determined by 
its own choice of ??  which is set in Cournot competition with the others. 
 
Combining the above equations, each locality thus chooses ??  to maximize (13) subject to (26): 
 
??  =  ?[3(?? +  ??)?(?? +  ??) – ? ??? ??  ] + (1 – (?? +  ??)?(?? +  ??)  (27) 
 
The first order conditions are: 
??(???)  = 13 ? – (1 – ??  – ??) ?? ? +  (?? +  ??  ) ??  
            (28) 
for n = 1, 2, 3  implying  
??
?   =  ???  = ??? =  (?? +  ??)?(?? +  ??)    (29) 
 
Since 
??(??)[???(??? ?)??’] 
?? – (? – ?? – ?)??’  decreases monotonically in the tax rate (?? + ?), comparing the 
outcomes under centralization (17) and decentralization (28), we see that the aggregate tax rate is 
higher under decentralization,(?? +  ??) > (?? +  ??). This also implies higher public spending 
under decentralization ??  > ??, because equilibrium public spending is increasing in the 
aggregate tax rate. Below (28) is rewritten so that the marginal benefit from raising the tax rate is 
on the left-hand side, and its marginal cost in terms of lower private consumption is on the right-
hand side.  
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??(???)   ?(??? + ??)???(??  + ?)  =  ?  13?(? ? ??? ? ??)??  ?(??  + ?)  
            (30) 
Equation (30) illustrates that for the local government the cost of increased spending is only one 
third, while the remaining two thirds are left to the other two localities to bear. Local units 
commit to inefficiently high levels of spending and ignore the costs to other localities. Localities 
overspend because otherwise the central government would tax them to finance the overspending 
of the others. However, localities are identical so they do not receive a net transfer, where 
?? > ???, but spending and revenues collected in a locality are equal. The important point is that 
local units have an incentive to bid in excess even though they do not necessarily receive the 
funds.  
 
Decentralized decision making thus entails overspending. Centralization increases ownership and 
accountability of the spending decisions (hardens the budget constraint), which has been the 
problem of the traditional forms of aid. Since foreign aid is fundamentally about rich people 
giving money to the poor, it means that those who benefit from aid financed services are not the 
ones who pay for it. Even though aid does not explicitly feature in the models, due to this analogy 
of the divergence of costs and benefits and the resulting coordination failure of the decision 
makers, off-budget aid can be thought of as a fragmented budget process, whereas budget support 
corresponds to a centralized budget process as it improves coordination of spending decisions. 
 
Within this framework, the four deviations that undermine a centralized budget process and lead 
to an inefficient spending outcome could be interpreted as off-budget aid such as project aid that 
is directly disbursed to the MDA, and financial consequences of off-budget financing (e.g. 
construction of a school or a hospital financed with foreign aid with subsequent running costs 
falling on the central government).  Koeberle and Stavreski (2006, 13) argue likewise for budget 
support:  
“Budget support provides more discipline in the budget process by reducing fragmentation and 
limiting the access of line ministries and other government agencies to extra-budgetary 
financing. It also can be expected to strengthen the government’s capacity to design and 
implement programs and poverty reduction strategies.” 
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5 Empirical approach to aid modality and fiscal discipline 
 
5.1 Debt sustainability as a measure of fiscal discipline 
Good macroeconomic policy is characterized by debt sustainability: government’s ability to fully 
service its debt (Wyplosz 2007). Research on developing countries also shows that low budget 
deficits and low levels of public debt are key determinants of economic growth (Adam & Bevan 
2005; Gupta, Clements & Inchauste 2004; Gupta, Clements & Baldacci 2005). ODA is expected 
to help the receiving countries achieve greater fiscal sustainability but evidence indicates to the 
opposite direction (Mayr 2010, 21).  
 
Mayr (2010) among others shows that despite substantial inflows of foreign aid, debt burdens in 
developing countries are still high, which can adversely affect fiscal sustainability.  Figure 4 
shows a positive correlation between ODA and net external borrowing.   
 
 
Figure 4: ODA and borrowing, 1991-2005 
 
Source: Mayr 2010. Data obtained from the OECD Development aid database (2008) and the United Nations 
Common Database online (2008). 
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This section analyzes empirically the relationship between fiscal policy, aggregate public sector 
debt sustainability and general budget support. Public sector debt sustainability is taken as a 
measure of fiscal discipline to study whether government budget deficits are more sustainable in 
the presence of general budget support than when a country receives off-budget aid. The second 
research question is, in fact, a hypothesis formulated from the theoretical part in section 4.  
 
Instead of determining sustainable debt levels, the focus will be on determining the primary 
balances required for the accumulated stock of debt to be on a sustainable level. This approach 
will be indicative about the fiscal effort needed to fully service the debt, given predicted 
macroeconomic conditions.  
 
5.2 Methodology 
The sustainability model was developed by Edwards (2003) to evaluate fiscal policy 
sustainability of the countries graduating from the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) 
program of the IMF and World Bank. Here the model is used to compute the fiscal policy path 
that is compatible with aggregate public sector debt sustainability in selected Sub-Saharan 
African countries that receive general budget support. Fiscal sustainability is achieved when “the 
ratio of public sector debt to GDP is stationary, and consistent with the overall demand for 
government securities”, both domestic and foreign (Edwards 2003, 3).   
 
The framework has been chosen because it escapes certain caveats that are common to debt 
sustainability computations (Wyplosz 2007). First, it considers aggregate public sector debt, 
while most calculations (IMF among others) only concentrate on external debt. Second, when 
both domestic and external (foreign) stocks of debt are included, GDP is a more appropriate 
benchmark for the debt ratio than exports because it reflects the ability of the entire economy to 
generate income. Third, instead of looking at the level of debt, the analysis focuses on primary 
fiscal positions consistent with debt sustainability. The reason is that primary balance, defined as 
the nominal balance16 excluding total interest payments, is a policy instrument used to reach debt 
                                                  
16 Nominal balance is defined as revenue, including nondebt-creating grants, less expenditure. 
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sustainability. Finally, the model is dynamic and takes into account the transition from the initial 
point to the steady state.  
 
5.2.1. Model 
The model considers two kinds of public debt17.   
 
1) External or foreign debt denoted DF18. This is concessional/subsidized debt granted by 
the multilaterals and other international donors. 
2) Domestic debt denoted DD. This is debt issued on commercial terms and assumed to be 
held by local residents only.  
 
Both types of debt are assumed to be denominated in US dollars. Total public sector, US dollar 
denominated debt (D) equals DF+DD and, at any time ? , the net increase in total debt equals the 
sum of the increase in the two types of debt: ? D? = ?DF? ? ?DD? . On the other side, net debt 
increases equal nominal interest payments (??
? , ???)19 on foreign and domestic debt plus the 
primary balance (pb) minus seignorage (?B?):  
 
? D? = (???DF???+ ???DD???) + pb? ? ?B?.     (31) 
 
In (31) a positive pb means a primary deficit and??B? denotes the change in the monetary base, or 
the stock of monetary liabilities, which reflects seignorage. Equation (31) thus says that changes 
in fiscal balance are financed by changes in debt and/or monetary base. In developing countries 
seignorage revenue is viewed as a source of fiscal financing (Cuddington 1997) and its 
magnitude depends on the rate of domestic inflation (?), the ratio of the monetary base (B) (or 
base money, or degree of monetization in the economy,) to nominal GDP (Y) and the income 
elasticity of demand for money20.  More specifically, the monetary base evolves according to the 
rule:  
 
                                                  
17 For alternative definitions of domestic and external/foreign debt, see Panizza (2008) 
18 Denoted DC in Edwards (2003) 
19 Interest rate on foreign/concessional debt is denoted ??
? in Edwards (2003). 
20 Money demand is assumed to have unitary income elasticity. 
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B? = (g + ?)B???.      (32) 
 
The scope is to compute the sustainable primary balance to GDP ratios, in other words, the value 
of ????
??
? that is “consistent with changes in aggregate public sector debt that are on a sustainable 
path” (Edwards 2002, 5). Debt is on a sustainable path when each type of debt increases at the 
same rate as national and international creditors desire to accumulate government-issued 
securities. This is an important assumption as it allows the government stock of debt to evolve 
according to the creditors’ behavior. In the basic framework it is assumed that international 
creditors are willing to accumulate debt at a rate ? and holders of domestic debt at a rate ?. 
Neither of the debt to GDP ratios can grow without limit so they are bounded in the long run: 
 
? ? (g + ??);  ? ? (g + ?).     (33) 
 
 The above constraint assures convergence of ???
?
?, the primary debt to GDP, through time. 
 
Putting equations (31), (32) and (33) together yields a general expression for the dynamic 
behavior of the sustainable primary balance to GDP ratio: 
 
?
???
??
? = ? ?? ???? ?????? ? ?(??????)(???)? ??? ?????????? ?(??????)  – (g + ?) ?????? (34) 
 
Where ????
??
? and ????
??
?are the initial ratios of the face value of domestic and foreign debt, 
respectively, ???
??
? denotes the initial ratio of base money to GDP and ?  is the rate of domestic 
inflation, while ?? denotes the rate US inflation and e the Euler’s number. The model focuses on 
the face value rather than on the present value of debt, as the approach is more transparent in 
describing the flows involved. Since ?  and g refer to target rates of domestic inflation and 
growth, the results obtained are conditional on the assumption that the targets are met. 
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According to the equation (33), the dynamic path for the sustainable primary balance depends on 
the following key variables: nominal interest rates on domestic and foreign debt, rate of growth 
of real GDP, rates of domestic and foreign inflation and the sustainable growth rates of domestic 
and foreign debt {r??, r??, g,??????? ?}. 
 
5.2.2. Design 
Domestic debt (DD) is assumed to grow at the rate of nominal GDP: ? = (g + ??). While the 
domestic debt to GDP ratio is assumed to remain at the level of period t=0, four possible 
scenarios for the evolution of concessional loans (?) will be considered.  
 
? Case A: ? = 0. This is the most conservative scenario. It is assumed that no net funds are 
provided so that the nominal value of concessional debt stays constant. In other words 
concessional loans are fully rolled over. 
? Case B: ? =  ??. Donors are willing to maintain the real dollar value of the concessional 
debt. Foreign debt thus grows at the rate of international inflation.  
? Case  C:  ? = (?g + ??), where 0  ? ? < 1. It is assumed that concessional funds 
increase in real terms.  
? Case D: ? = (g + ??). This is the most optimistic scenario and corresponds to the case 
C, where ? = 1. Concessional funds are provided sufficiently to maintain the external 
debt to GDP ratio at the same level as in period t=0.   
 
By focusing on the availability of concessional loans, while assuming domestic debt to GDP ratio 
constant, the approach provides insight on how efforts to achieve debt sustainability depend on 
donor behavior. See Appendix C for the sustainable and steady state primary balances and debt to 
GDP ratios for the cases A-D used in computations. 
 
The  scope  of  the  analysis  is  to  examine,  whether  the  sample  countries’  fiscal  discipline  has  
improved since they started receiving (non-earmarked) general budget support. When sustainable 
public debt levels are taken as an indication of fiscal discipline, the research hypothesis can be 
formulated as follows: fiscal positions are on a more sustainable level when a country receives 
general budget support than when it receives traditional forms of aid. 
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With this purpose, sustainable debt paths are simulated for two separate periods. As budget 
support has been provided in its non-earmarked, direct budget support form since year 2000, it 
becomes natural to set this year as a benchmark and compare fiscal sustainability in pre- and 
post-2000 eras. Based on the preceding discussion on GBS and its impact on fiscal behavior, 
setting year 2000 as a benchmark will allow assessing fiscal discipline in pre- and post-GBS eras.  
Hence a pre-2000 and a post-2000 debt sustainability simulation is conducted for 11 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, which have received GBS in years 2005 and 2007 according to the OECD’s 
Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration 2006 and 2008. Table 3 shows the amount (in 
millions of US dollars) of budget support each country has received. Other countries that have 
received budget support in both years (Burundi, Rwanda and Sierra Leone) have been excluded 
from the sample because of difficulties encountered in finding data.  
 
 
Table 3: Budget support in the sample countries 
  U$D m % of GNI 
  2005 2007 2005 2007 
Benin 13,03 15,90 0,31 0,29 
Burkina Faso 44,31 65,48 0,82 0,97 
Cape Verde 1,86 10,27 0,19 0,78 
Ghana 98,44 172,71 0,93 1,18 
Malawi 60,53 45,43 2,15 1,28 
Mali 33,60 39,22 0,66 0,53 
Mozambique 153,34 247,33 2,47 3,37 
Niger 9,94 11,64 0,29 0,27 
Tanzania 262,22 458,88 1,87 2,85 
Uganda 54,74 132,40 0,62 1,10 
Zambia 36,24 112,87 0,54 1,13 
 
Source of data: OECD Paris Monitoring Survey 2006 & 2008; author’s calculations 
 
1999 is set as a base year (t=0) for the first, pre-2000 era simulation. Based on the 
macroeconomic variables of the base year, the sustainable fiscal policy path for 10 years is 
computed. As enough time needs to elapse before GBS can be expected to have an impact on 
fiscal behavior, year 2008 has been selected as a base year (t=0) for the second, post-2000 era 
simulation. It is also realistic to assume fiscal policy to have macroeconomic effects in the 
medium term. In the short term macroeconomic effects might not yet be observable, whereas in 
the long term there could be other changes in the economy obscuring the effects of budget 
support.  
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The resulting primary balances are informative about the fiscal adjustment required for the base 
year (t=0) stock of public debt to be sustainable, given the assumptions on its evolution made in 
the four scenarios. It is thus possible to compare the fiscal effort needed to sustain the existing 
debt levels before and after the countries start receiving budget support.  
 
5.2.3. Calibration and data 
This sub-section briefly presents the parameter values used to compute the sustainable fiscal 
paths before and after countries start receiving budget support (See Table 4 for details). The data 
used  in  computations  has  been  collected  from  various  sources,  such  as  the  IMF  Financial  
Statistics Database, IMF Country Reports (Article IV documents) and Working Papers, World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) Online and the United Nations Common Database 
(See Appendices A and B for a summary on variables and sources).  
 
In the first simulation, where sustainable primary balances are computed for the pre-2000 era, 
base year t(0)=1999, whereas the second simulation is post-2000 and t(0)=2008. Due to data 
availability, Burkina Faso’s base year in the second simulation is set at 2007.  
 
Initial external/concessionary debt to GDP ratios ????
??
? and initial domestic debt to GDP ratios 
????
??
?  and base money ???
??
? are actual, realized values in the base year21.  External debt ratios 
have been created by using data from the World Bank and the United Nations databases, while 
domestic debt ratios have been derived from various sources.  Rate of accumulation of debt, ? 
and?? get different values as of cases A-D. By construction, domestic debt remains at its base line 
level. In case C it is assumed that ? = ½. In the first simulation, rate of growth of nominal GDP 
in US$, interest rates and domestic rate of inflation are historical averages for the simulation 
period 1999-2009. The annual US inflation rate is assumed 2,50%, which is the historical average 
for the period 1999-2009. 
  
Also in the second simulation, where countries have started receiving budget support, t(0) = 
2008,  primary balances are computed for a 10-year period. Nominal GDP growth in US$, 
                                                  
21 Because of lack of data, for some countries domestic debt ratios for year 2000 are used. 
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interest rates and domestic rate of inflation are again period averages22.  Actual data is used 
where available23, the rest are IMF staff estimates.  The results are conditional on the assumption 
that these target rates are achieved.   
  
                                                  
22 In specific, averages for 2008-2015 are used. 
23 2008 and 2009 
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Table 4: Main assumptions for assessing public sector debt sustainability.  
Base year 1999               
  
Real 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation 
Nominal 
domestic 
interest 
rate 
Nominal 
foreign 
interest 
rate 
Reserve 
money/ 
GDP 
Nominal 
GDP 
growth 
External 
debt/ 
GDP 
Domestic 
debt/ 
GDP 
Benin 4,17 3,25 18 0,98 12,2 7,75 61,70 15 
Burkina Faso 5,56 2,09 18 1,01 10,1 7,42 45,08 15 
Cape Verde 5,46 2,44 8 1,84 18,94 7,63 52,45 26,00 
Ghana 5,04 21,21 37 1,13 20,55 28,35 66,72 29,00 
Malawi 3,09 28,08 35 0,88 7,64 31,32 145,64 11 
Mali  4,89 3,17 18 1,10 11,2 9,10 109,46 15 
Mozambique 7,75 8,80 17 0,78 6,29 17,97 119,19 12,08 
Niger 4,46 2,58 18 0,98 3,5 7,27 73,87 15 
Tanzania 6,70 9,21 17 0,85 7,9 16,18 75,81 12 
Uganda 7,19 4,49 10 0,80 5,5 12,64 49,91 2 
Zambia 4,83 20,75 36,19 1,02 12,43 26,46 143,88 5,00 
Average 5,37 9,64 21,11 1,03 10,55 15,64 85,79 14,28 
 
Base year 2008 
              
  
Real 
GDP 
growth 
Inflation 
Nominal 
domestic 
interest 
rate 
Nominal 
foreign 
interest 
rate 
Reserve 
money/ 
GDP 
Nominal 
GDP 
growth 
External 
debt/ 
GDP 
Domestic 
debt/ 
GDP 
Benin 5,07 3,47 2,70 1,39 10,00 8,54 13,87 4,3 
Burkina Faso  4,77 2,94 4,57 1,13 22,60 7,71 18,66 1,4 
Cape Verde 5,93 2,46 4,89 1,44 20,00 8,39 35,31 15,8 
Ghana 7,16 10,15 11,79 4,85 12,60 17,31 21,16 29,8 
Malawi 7,17 8,06 16,86 0,96 6,00 15,23 19,64 19,00 
Mali  4,97 3,34 9,28 1,09 12,60 8,31 24,59 2,5 
Mozambique 7,26 6,13 12,50 1,79 8,00 13,39 28,64 4,1 
Niger 6,33 3,21 6,03 1,67 1,66 9,54 16,49 5,7 
Tanzania 6,95 7,19 9,89 1,24 9,87 14,14 18,11 14,3 
Uganda 7,09 7,24 11,61 1,29 6,50 14,33 12,26 10,70 
Zambia 5,91 9,44 11,99 1,94 5,83 15,36 8,15 15,5 
Average 6,24 5,78 9,28 1,71 10,52 12,02 19,72 11,19 
 
Source: IMF, WB, AfDB; author’s calculations 
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5.3 Simulation results 
The debt sustainability exercise consists of two simulations both with four cases (A-D) for 11 
Sub-Saharan countries that have received the “new” budget support in years 2005 and 2007. 
Results are reported in Table 6 so that a minus sign (-) indicates a primary deficit, whereas a plus 
sign (+) stands for a primary surplus. The higher the primary surplus, the larger the fiscal effort 
needed to achieve debt sustainability, which implies fiscal indiscipline in and/or before the base 
year. High primary surpluses are a case of concern also because, in the light of historical budget 
balances, they are not very realistic in developing countries (e.g. Mayr 2010, 21). Table 5 shows 
that net borrowing has been positive in the least developed and low income countries throughout 
the period 2001-2005.  
 
The following conclusions can be drawn from Table 6: 
 
? Depending on the scenario, the sustainable balance can be either a deficit (a negative number) 
or a surplus (a positive number). 
? The speed at which the steady state is reached depends on the value of ?. The stock of 
external debt declines faster, when ? is small, i.e. debt accumulates slowly. 
? In case D both domestic and external debt ratios are kept constant so the steady state is 
achieved instantly in year 1.  
? In case A of the first simulation (base year 1999) most countries (all except for Cape Verde, 
Uganda and Zambia) start with positive figures. This means that fiscal sustainability before 
year 2000 requires primary surpluses. 
? In the second simulation (base year 2008) all but one country (Malawi) can allow deficits to 
arise in cases A and B. In cases C and D all countries can afford deficits.  
? In case A the fiscal effort is higher in the first simulation in all but one country (Zambia). 
Most countries’ fiscal effort is clearly greater in the first than in the second simulation in 
cases A and B. 
? In the first simulation, all figures turn into negative in cases C and D. Especially in case D 
large deficits are allowed. Contrary to the cases A and B, in cases C and D larger deficits 
arise in the first than in the second simulation. This is most obviously due to the fact that 
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cases A-D move gradually from the most conservative to the most optimistic scenario in 
terms of new debt accumulation.   
 
In the first simulation, the initial levels of external debt are significantly higher than in the second 
simulation. As cases C and D assume that debt levels increase in real terms, or remain constant 
relative to GDP, very high deficits arise.  At the same time domestic debt ratios are assumed to 
remain at their initial, remarkably lower levels. It is unlikely that international donors would be 
willing to maintain such high debt levels at concessional interest rates. Extremely high deficits 
arise because the creditors’ behavior is assumed unrealistically optimistic. Hence, cases A and B 
can be viewed as most realistic.  
 
Comparing each country’s sustainable balances before and after year 2000 under cases A and B, 
the exercise indicates greater fiscal discipline in the second simulation, i.e. after countries started 
receiving budget support. Even though the assumptions on foreign creditors’ willingness to 
provide additional funds at the same rates is unlikely, the simulation exercise is still informative 
about the impact of projected and realized fiscal policies on debt sustainability. 
 
Table 5: Total external stock of debt and net borrowing (% of GDP) by country income group, 2000-2005 
Source: Mayr (2010). Data extracted from UN Common Database (2008), OECD Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries (2009).  
Note: Outliers with net borrowing smaller than -100% or larger than 100% of GDP are excluded.  
ª According to the DAC list of ODA recipients available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd as of April 2008. 
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5.4 Critical evaluation 
Main weaknesses of the framework used are its focus on the availability of external debt, and 
results that rely on exogenous assumptions on growth, inflation, and interest rates.  However, 
endogenizing the assumptions requires a general equilibrium exercise, which is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis was designed to study the debt sustainability of the sample countries, 
which have received budget support without any comparison to countries that have not received 
aid in such form. The analysis could thus be extended to two groups of countries; those that have 
received budget support after year 2000 and those who have not. This would allow identifying 
whether there is a tendency of improved fiscal discipline also in countries that have not received 
budget support. Comparing country groups would remove those factors that affect debt 
accumulation and debt sustainability but are not explained by the model.  
 
Another useful exercise would be to analyze the results with respect to the relative amount of 
budget support each country received. Finally, the availability and conformity of data, especially 
estimates for years ahead, significantly restrict the choice set of sample countries.  
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Table 6: Sustainable fiscal primary balances. Simulation results.  
Base year t(0)=1999 
Case A (? = 0) 
Yea
r 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozam- 
bique 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 1,26 1,03 -0,59 3,25 1,90 1,71 0,54 1,98 0,19 -0,27 -0,47 
2 1,22 1,00 -0,66 3,20 1,83 1,63 0,46 1,93 0,14 -0,30 -0,56 
3 1,19 0,97 -0,72 3,15 1,77 1,55 0,38 1,89 0,09 -0,33 -0,65 
4 1,15 0,94 -0,78 3,11 1,71 1,49 0,32 1,85 0,05 -0,36 -0,74 
5 1,12 0,92 -0,84 3,07 1,65 1,42 0,26 1,82 0,01 -0,39 -0,82 
6 1,10 0,89 -0,89 3,03 1,60 1,36 0,20 1,78 -0,03 -0,41 -0,89 
7 1,07 0,87 -0,93 2,99 1,55 1,31 0,15 1,75 -0,06 -0,43 -0,95 
8 1,04 0,85 -0,97 2,96 1,50 1,25 0,11 1,72 -0,09 -0,45 -1,02 
9 1,02 0,83 -1,01 2,93 1,46 1,21 0,07 1,69 -0,12 -0,47 -1,07 
10 1,00 0,81 -1,05 2,90 1,42 1,16 0,03 1,67 -0,14 -0,48 -1,13 
            
Ss 0,69 -0,76 -1,50 -5,31 -2,35 0,58 -1,03 1,31 -1,25 -0,64 -3,17 
           
     
Case B (? = ?*) 
     
Yea
r 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozambiq
ue 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -0,19 -0,01 -1,81 1,70 -1,55 -0,84 -2,16 0,25 -1,55 -1,41 -3,82 
2 -0,15 0,02 -1,79 1,74 -1,48 -0,77 -2,02 0,30 -1,47 -1,35 -3,73 
3 -0,12 0,05 -1,77 1,78 -1,42 -0,71 -1,90 0,34 -1,40 -1,30 -3,64 
4 -0,09 0,08 -1,76 1,82 -1,36 -0,64 -1,78 0,38 -1,34 -1,26 -3,55 
5 -0,05 0,11 -1,74 1,85 -1,29 -0,59 -1,67 0,42 -1,28 -1,21 -3,47 
6 -0,02 0,14 -1,73 1,89 -1,23 -0,53 -1,57 0,46 -1,22 -1,17 -3,39 
7 0,00 0,17 -1,72 1,92 -1,17 -0,48 -1,47 0,50 -1,17 -1,14 -3,32 
8 0,03 0,19 -1,71 1,95 -1,12 -0,43 -1,38 0,53 -1,12 -1,10 -3,25 
9 0,06 0,21 -1,69 1,98 -1,06 -0,38 -1,30 0,57 -1,07 -1,07 -3,18 
10 0,09 0,23 -1,68 2,01 -1,01 -0,33 -1,23 0,60 -1,03 -1,04 -3,12 
            
Ss 0,69 -0,76 -1,50 -5,31 -2,35 0,58 -1,03 1,31 -1,25 -0,64 -3,17 
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Case C (? =  ?g + ?*) 
    
Yea
r 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozambiq
ue 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -1,40 -1,17 -3,13 4,62 -3,68 -3,33 -6,35 -1,29 -3,87 -3,30 -7,06 
2 -1,35 -1,12 -3,09 4,68 -3,59 -3,23 -6,12 -1,23 -3,76 -3,22 -6,93 
3 -1,31 -1,07 -3,05 4,74 -3,50 -3,14 -5,90 -1,17 -3,65 -3,14 -6,81 
4 -1,27 -1,03 -3,00 4,80 -3,42 -3,05 -5,69 -1,12 -3,54 -3,06 -6,69 
5 -1,23 -0,98 -2,96 4,85 -3,33 -2,96 -5,48 -1,07 -3,44 -2,98 -6,57 
6 -1,19 -0,94 -2,92 4,91 -3,25 -2,88 -5,29 -1,01 -3,34 -2,91 -6,46 
7 -1,15 -0,90 -2,88 4,96 -3,17 -2,80 -5,10 -0,96 -3,24 -2,84 -6,34 
8 -1,11 -0,86 -2,85 5,01 -3,09 -2,71 -4,91 -0,91 -3,15 -2,77 -6,24 
9 -1,08 -0,82 -2,81 5,06 -3,01 -2,63 -4,74 -0,86 -3,06 -2,70 -6,13 
10 -1,04 -0,78 -2,77 5,11 -2,93 -2,56 -4,57 -0,82 -2,97 -2,64 -6,03 
            
Ss 0,69 -0,76 -1,50 -5,31 -2,35 0,58 -1,03 1,31 -1,25 -0,64 -3,17 
            
     
Case D  (? = g + ?*) 
     
Yea
r 
Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozambiq
ue 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
2 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
3 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
4 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
5 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
6 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
7 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
8 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
9 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
10 -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
            
Ss -2,60 -2,33 -4,46 -1,43 -5,81 -5,82 -10,54 -2,83 -6,20 -4,68 -10,29 
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(Table 4 continues) 
Base year t(0)=2008  
     
Case A (? = 0) 
     
Year Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozamb
ique 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -0,87 -1,58 -1,72 -0,67 0,50 -0,76 -0,50 -0,05 -1,13 -0,59 -0,24 
2 -0,88 -1,60 -1,76 -0,75 0,49 -0,77 -0,55 -0,07 -1,15 -0,60 -0,25 
3 -0,90 -1,61 -1,80 -0,83 0,47 -0,79 -0,59 -0,09 -1,17 -0,61 -0,26 
4 -0,91 -1,62 -1,83 -0,90 0,46 -0,81 -0,62 -0,11 -1,18 -0,63 -0,27 
5 -0,92 -1,63 -1,86 -0,97 0,45 -0,82 -0,65 -0,13 -1,20 -0,64 -0,28 
6 -0,93 -1,64 -1,89 -1,03 0,44 -0,83 -0,68 -0,14 -1,21 -0,64 -0,29 
7 -0,94 -1,65 -1,91 -1,08 0,43 -0,85 -0,71 -0,16 -1,22 -0,65 -0,30 
8 -0,94 -1,66 -1,93 -1,13 0,42 -0,86 -0,73 -0,17 -1,23 -0,66 -0,30 
9 -0,95 -1,67 -1,95 -1,17 0,41 -0,87 -0,76 -0,18 -1,24 -0,67 -0,31 
10 -0,96 -1,68 -1,97 -1,21 0,40 -0,88 -0,78 -0,19 -1,25 -0,67 -0,32 
            
Ss -1,05 -1,74 -1,68 -2,18 -0,90 -1,01 -1,07 -0,31 -1,40 -0,93 -0,89 
            
     
Case B (? = ?*) 
     
Year Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali 
Mozamb
ique 
Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -1,19 -2,02 -2,54 -1,15 0,05 -1,33 -1,15 -0,43 -1,55 -0,87 -0,43 
2 -1,19 -2,01 -2,52 -1,18 0,07 -1,31 -1,14 -0,42 -1,53 -0,86 -0,42 
3 -1,18 -2,00 -2,50 -1,21 0,09 -1,30 -1,13 -0,42 -1,52 -0,85 -0,42 
4 -1,17 -1,99 -2,48 -1,24 0,11 -1,28 -1,12 -0,41 -1,51 -0,84 -0,42 
5 -1,17 -1,98 -2,46 -1,26 0,12 -1,27 -1,11 -0,40 -1,50 -0,84 -0,42 
Ss -1,16 -1,97 -2,45 -1,29 0,14 -1,26 -1,10 -0,40 -1,49 -0,83 -0,42 
7 -1,15 -1,96 -2,43 -1,31 0,15 -1,25 -1,09 -0,39 -1,48 -0,82 -0,41 
8 -1,15 -1,95 -2,42 -1,33 0,16 -1,23 -1,08 -0,39 -1,47 -0,82 -0,41 
9 -1,14 -1,94 -2,41 -1,35 0,18 -1,22 -1,07 -0,38 -1,46 -0,81 -0,41 
10 -1,14 -1,93 -2,40 -1,37 0,19 -1,21 -1,07 -0,38 -1,45 -0,81 -0,41 
            
Ss -1,05 -1,74 -1,68 -2,18 -0,90 -1,01 -1,07 -0,31 -1,40 -0,93 -0,89 
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Case C (? = ?g + ?*) 
    
Year Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -1,52 -2,43 -3,50 -0,51 -0,59 -1,90 -2,10 -0,91 -2,12 -1,38 -0,65 
2 -1,51 -2,42 -3,46 -0,51 -0,56 -1,88 -2,06 -0,89 -2,10 -1,36 -0,64 
3 -1,50 -2,40 -3,43 -0,50 -0,54 -1,85 -2,02 -0,87 -2,07 -1,35 -0,64 
4 -1,49 -2,39 -3,39 -0,49 -0,52 -1,83 -1,99 -0,86 -2,05 -1,33 -0,63 
5 -1,47 -2,37 -3,36 -0,48 -0,50 -1,81 -1,95 -0,84 -2,02 -1,31 -0,62 
6 -1,46 -2,36 -3,32 -0,48 -0,48 -1,79 -1,91 -0,82 -2,00 -1,30 -0,62 
7 -1,45 -2,35 -3,29 -0,47 -0,46 -1,77 -1,88 -0,81 -1,98 -1,28 -0,61 
8 -1,44 -2,33 -3,26 -0,46 -0,44 -1,76 -1,85 -0,79 -1,95 -1,27 -0,61 
9 -1,43 -2,32 -3,23 -0,46 -0,42 -1,74 -1,82 -0,78 -1,93 -1,25 -0,60 
10 -1,42 -2,31 -3,20 -0,45 -0,40 -1,72 -1,79 -0,76 -1,91 -1,24 -0,60 
            
Ss -1,05 -1,74 -1,68 -2,18 -0,90 -1,01 -1,07 -0,31 -1,40 -0,93 -0,89 
            
     
Case D  (? = g + ?*) 
     
Year Benin 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cape 
Verde 
Ghana Malawi Mali Mozambique Niger Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
1 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
2 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
3 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
4 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
5 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
6 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
7 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
8 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
9 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
10 -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
            
Ss -1,85 -2,85 -4,47 -2,53 -1,23 -2,47 -3,05 -1,39 -2,70 -1,66 -0,87 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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6 Conclusions 
Aid affects growth through several channels. Since most aid goes to the government and through 
the political decision making process, government behavior plays an important role in aid 
effectiveness. Currently the fiscal impact of aid is studied in the aid fungibility and fiscal 
response literature. They study how fiscal behavior of the receiving country government affects 
aid effectiveness. The contradictory results obtained are viewed as modeling, or econometric 
issues that have been tried to resolve accordingly, by improving the models.  
 
However studying mere accounting relationships does not tell us why aid sometimes results in 
excess public borrowing and deficits. It is important to acknowledge that aid itself also affects 
fiscal behavior and a deeper understanding of how government behavior alters when public 
expenditure is financed with foreign aid is needed.  Financing public spending with external 
funds, which are managed outside the budget are found to undermine accountability, weaken 
institutions and distort incentives to maintain fiscal discipline.  
 
Research on the fiscal impact of aid done to date, including the recent paper by Mayr (2010), who 
finds a policy of running budget deficits to be optimal in the presence of foreign aid, ignores the 
existence of various aid instruments. Yet the criticism against the current aid system mainly 
arises from factors such as distorted incentives, weak institutions, problems caused by a great 
number of uncoordinated donors and the lack of accountability of the receiving country 
government. These factors are claimed to be related to the traditional aid instruments, which are 
disbursed outside the government budget. The assessment of aid effectiveness should better take 
into consideration the changes in aid giving, especially the shift away from the traditional forms 
of aid, such as project and program aid, towards directly supporting government budgets. 
 
Thereby the first aim of the thesis was to explain theoretically the mechanisms that determine 
fiscal discipline in the presence of foreign aid. The common pool resource -approach shows that 
external funds, such as foreign aid, may lead to fiscal indiscipline because the budget constraint is 
not internalized, i.e. the cost burden of spending is not borne solely by the spending unit, which 
incentivizes higher spending. The soft budget constraint goes a step further and illustrates that 
external finance makes the spending units perceive the budget as flexible. In other words, aid 
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introduces an element of insurance in case of default and so induces moral hazard behavior. The 
soft budget constraint is elsewhere described as a fragmented budget process, whereby spending 
decisions are not coordinated. External funds that are managed outside the government budget 
lead to a fragmentation of the budget process. This is the case of the traditional forms of aid that 
are managed outside the budget, whereas centralized budget process hardens the budget 
constraint, improving fiscal discipline. This is why putting aid on budget is expected to result in 
greater fiscal discipline.  
 
This statement, that was first shown theoretically, was further formulated as a hypothesis for the 
second research question, and then tested empirically. Sustainable primary balances under four 
scenarios were calculated for 11 Sub-Saharan African countries that have received the new kind 
of budget support. According to two of the most realistic scenarios, in most of the sample 
countries running primary deficits slightly larger than before was in line with public debt 
sustainability. This is taken as an indication of improved fiscal discipline since the countries 
started to receive general budget support (GBS). So the empirical results support the earlier 
findings that foreign aid in its traditional form induces excess public borrowing. 
 
At the same time it should be noted that the empirical model suffers from some limitations. First, 
it relies on exogenous assumptions, or target rates of growth, inflation and interest rates.   
However, endogenizing the assumptions requires a general equilibrium exercise, which is beyond 
the scope of this study. The second limitation concerns the behavioral assumptions of the 
creditors. Even though the assumptions on foreign creditors’ willingness to provide additional 
funds at constant rates is unlikely, the simulation exercise is still informative about the impact of 
projected and realized fiscal policies on debt sustainability.       
 
It is evident that research should not anymore treat all foreign aid as if there was only one 
modality, but various aid instruments should be incorporated in the analysis. The next step within 
this debt sustainability framework would be to endogenize the variables used in calculations. 
Further research should focus on a more appropriate framework for debt sustainability 
assessment and put effort in finding appropriate data and reliable forecasts. The empirical testing 
could also be designed to study the debt sustainability of two groups of countries: those that have 
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received budget support after year 2000 and those who have not. This would allow identifying 
whether fiscal discipline has improved only in those countries that have received budget support. 
The debt sustainability exercise should also take into account the relative amount of GBS (for 
example, GBS to government revenues ratio and the amount of GBS relative to other forms of 
aid) that the countries have received. Finally, a more thorough research in many respects is 
needed to move away from associational to causal inference concerning budget support and fiscal 
discipline.  
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Appendix A Data description and sources. Base year 1999 
 
Variable and symbol     Description              Source 
Initial external debt to GDP ratio ????
??
?     
 
 
Initial domestic debt to GDP ratio ????
??
? 
 
 
 
 
Rate of accumulation of external  
debt going forward  ?  
 
Rate of accumulation of  
domestic debt  ? 
Rate of real GDP growth g 
Rate of US inflation    ?* 
Monetary base to GDP ratio  ???
??
? 
 
Domestic rate of inflation   ? 
Nominal interest rate on foreign funds r? 
Nominal interest rate on domestic funds  r? 
Public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt stocks to total GDP (current US$) 
in the base year. 
 
Treasury bills, bonds, government 
stocks. For some countries data for year 
2000 or average for 27 non-CFA SSA 
countries is used.  
 
Different assumptions, depending on the 
scenario being considered. 
 (g +??*) in the baseline scenario.  
 
Annual %, period average 
2,5% per year, period average 
Reserve money to nominal GDP, actual 
base year 
GDP deflator (annual %), period average 
Interest rate on new external debt 
commitments, official %, period average 
Nominal Treasury bill rate 1995-2000 
Created from the World Bank Global 
Development Finance Database and United 
Nations Common Database (2008) 
 
IMF WP/04/46.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF Financial Statistics database and 
Article IV documents 
 
World Development Indicators online 
(WDI) 2010 
 
WDI 2010 
  IMF WP/04/46 
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Appendix B Data description and sources. Base year 2008. 
 
Variable and symbol            Description             Source
Initial external debt to GDP ratio 
????
??
?     
 
Initial domestic debt to GDP ratio 
?
???
??
? 
 
 
Rate of accumulation of external  
debt going forward  ?  
 
Rate of accumulation of  
domestic debt  ? 
Rate of real GDP growth g 
 
Rate of US inflation    ?* 
Monetary base to GDP ratio  ???
??
? 
Domestic rate of inflation   ? 
Nominal interest rate on foreign 
funds r? 
 
Nominal interest rate on domestic 
funds  r?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Public and publicly guaranteed external 
debt stocks to total GDP (current US$) in 
the base year 
 
Actual figures, IMF estimates 
 
 
 
Different assumptions, depending on the 
scenario being considered. 
 (g +??*) 
 
IMF staff estimates, period average 
 
Assumption 2,5% per year 
Reserve money to nominal GDP, actual 
base year  
GDP deflator (annual %), IMF staff 
estimates, period average 
IMF staff estimates, period average 
 
IMF staff estimates, period average 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Created from World Bank Global 
Development Finance Database and United 
Nations Common Database (2008) 
 
IMF Article IV documents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMF Financial Statistics Online Database and 
IMF Article IV documents 
 
IMF Article IV documents 
 
IMF Article IV documents 
 
IMF Article IV documents 
 
IMF Article IV documents 
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Appendix C: Sustainable and steady state primary balances and debt/GDP ratios under alternative scenarios 
CASE Dynamic path of sustainable primary balance to GDP 
ratio 
Steady state sustainable primary balance to GDP ratio 
A: 
 
? = 0 
? = (g +  ??) 
 
?
???
??
? = ?? ???? ?????? ? ??(????)(???)? ?????? ?????????? ?(??????) – (g +
?)???
??
?  
?
pb?Y? ? = ?g + ?? ? r?? ?DD?Y? ?(1 + g + ??) – (g + ?) ?B?Y?? 
B:  
 
? =  ?? 
? = (g +  ??) 
 
?
???
??
? = ???? ???? ?????? ? ?(??)(???)? ?????? ?????????? ?(??????) – (g +
?)???
??
?  
?
pb?Y? ? = ?g + ?? ? r?? ?DD?Y? ?(1 + g + ??) – (g + ?) ?B?Y?? 
C:  
 
? = (?g + ??) 
? = (g +  ??) 
 
?
???
??
? = ???? ??? ???? ?????? ? ?(? ?)(???)? ?????? ?????????? ?(??????)   – (g + ?) ???
??
?  
?
pb?Y? ? = ?g + ?? ? r?? ?DD?Y? ?(1 + g + ??) – (g + ?) ?B?Y?? 
D:  
 
? = (g + ??) 
? = (g +  ??) 
 
????
??
? =  ???
??
?
( ?? ??) ? ????????? ??????????? ?(??????)  – (g + ?)??????  ?pb?Y? ? = ?D?Y?? (g +  ??)? r?? ?DC?D? ? ? r?? ?DD?D? ?(1 + g + ??)  – (g + ?)?B?Y?? 
Note: In these equations a positive pb/Y means a primary deficit, whereas a negative pb/Y indicates a primary surplus. 
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